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Abstract 
The special role courts play in a democracy requires designers of constitutions to 
consider the delicate trade-offs between democratic accountability and judicial 
independence.  This dissertation analyzes the decisional consequences of state supreme 
court institutional structures.  States utilize several types of election and elite 
reconfirmation, and each method carries a systematically different risk of incumbent 
defeat.  My theory predicts that as reappointment uncertainty increases, judicial 
independence decreases.  I define judicial independence as decisions made by judges 
using only considerations that are internal to the rule of law.  I measure judicial 
independence by quantifying the external influence of partisan, elite, popular, and 
economic pressures applied to judges.  I conclude by considering the normative 
implications of the empirical findings.  Because judicial independence is a problem of 
optimization, not maximization, constitutional designers hope to strike a balance between 
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Chapter One: The Growing Importance of State Supreme Courts 
 
[A]ny selection or retention method that makes popularity the standard for measuring 
fitness for judicial office creates an unacceptable risk of conflict between the judge’s duty 
to apply the law impartially and his or her interest in retaining office. 
 
Justice John Paul Stevens (1998)   
 
 On April 3, 2009, Iowa became the center of attention in American politics, and 
for once, the reason had nothing to do with the state’s caucuses.  State supreme courts 
rarely make front-page news, but this was no ordinary day.  A unanimous Iowa Supreme 
Court announced its decision in Varnum v. Brien (2009), holding that the state’s 
definition of marriage as being between one man and one woman violated the guarantee 
of equal protection in the Iowa Constitution.  The court ordered local officials to begin to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples seeking them.  With the bang of a gavel, 
Iowa became just the fourth state in the country to legalize gay marriage.  The three prior 
states were Massachusetts, California,1 and Connecticut.   
 There are, of course, two major differences between the earlier states and Iowa.  
First, justices in the four states are selected and reappointed in very different ways.  
Supreme court justices in Massachusetts enjoy life tenure,2 while the governor of 
Connecticut nominates justices from a list prepared by a judicial selection commission.  
At the end of their eight-year terms, the governor must renominate them, and the 
legislature must confirm them again.  Justices in California and Iowa initially earn their 
1 California voters subsequently overturned the state supreme court decision legalizing gay marriage 
through the Proposition 8 ballot initiative in November 2008.  In 2012, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
struck down Proposition 8 as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Perry v. 
Brown 2012). 
2 There is a mandatory retirement age of 70 for justices in Massachusetts.  Nineteen other states utilize 
mandatory retirement ages of some sort.(American Judicature Society 2013e). 
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seats in essentially the same manner, but at the end of each term – 12 years and eight 
years, respectively – are subject to a non-competitive retention election. 
The other key difference between Iowa and the other states that had legalized gay 
marriage is in ideology.  Just a year prior to the Iowa court’s decision, Governor Mike 
Huckabee, an ordained Baptist minister, won the Iowa caucuses on a socially 
conservative platform.  While Barack Obama won the state in the general election, Iowa 
is much more conservative than California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.   
In November 2010, Iowa made front-page news again when three of the justices 
of the Iowa Supreme Court that issued Varnum suffered defeats in their reelection bids.  
Despite millions of dollars spent by Christian conservatives to oppose these justices, none 
of the three justices raised any money or hired any staff to mount a reelection campaign 
(Sulzberger 2010).  They were the first incumbent justices ever to suffer reelection defeat 
since Iowa had adopted its current system of retention elections in 1962.3 
 Did these justices not understand the potential electoral ramifications of their gay-
rights decision?  Did they believe their primary responsibility was to the law (as they saw 
it) rather than to the voters?  Issuing a decision congruent with a judge’s view of the rule 
of law is an example of judicial independence, while suppressing that view in favor of the 
contrary views of outside actors would be an example of non-independence.  Federal 
judges have comparatively very little to worry about in terms of popular retribution for 
their decisions; the Constitution grants them life tenure and salary protection.  The states, 
3 Iowa’s experience is typical of state with merit selection and retention elections.  Carbon (1980) studied 
the first 45 years of retention election history across the 20 states that utilized them at either the supreme 
court or lower court level.  The study demonstrated that across all those state-years, only 33 judges seeking 
retention were defeated at the polls. 
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on the other hand, employ a variety of different judicial structures, which are listed in 
Table 1.1.  Forty-seven states require judges to be reappointed to their seats in some form 
at least once.  Ninety percent of the nation’s judges face some sort of popular election 
(Streb 2009).  Only 29 states protect judges’ salaries from being reduced (National Center 
for State Courts 2009).   
The degree to which state supreme court justices lose their jobs varies 
considerably.  Justices who have recently stood for reelection in partisan judicial 
elections face a defeat rate higher than incumbent governors as well as U.S. House and 
Senate incumbents (Bonneau and Hall 2009, 86).  Justices in states with nonpartisan 
elections also face a fairly risk of losing reelection, while retention elections typically 
provide high levels of job security, as do states in which judges must be reconfirmed.  
Table 1.2 lists these risks.  Of course, judges in all 50 states (and the federal system) face 
the threat of impeachment. 
 Under what conditions do state supreme court justices exhibit judicial 
independence?  That is, do different forms of reappointment, with their corresponding 
levels of job security, structure the degree to which judicial decisions reflect how judges 
view the law, rather than how outside actors view the law?  The answers to all of these 
questions are dependent upon an understanding of why the United States is one of only 
three countries in the world where even a few judges are elected.4 
 
4 The others are Japan and Switzerland, and in both those countries, the percentage of judges elected is very 
small (Shugerman 2009). 
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The Origin of Judicial Elections in America 
 
 Judicial independence has been a concern in the American political order since 
before there was even a United States.  Prior to the American Revolution, the royal 
governor, acting on behalf of the British Crown, appointed judges, and, unlike their 
brethren serving in England, colonial judges served at the pleasure of the monarch.  The 
Declaration of Independence listed judicial independence as a grievance, saying of King 
George III: “He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their 
Offices, and Amount and Payment of their Salaries” (Jefferson 1776).  During the 
Revolution, the right to jury trials was often suspended, which placed the fate of colonists 
in the hands of judges who have strong incentives to serve the King’s interests, rather 
than those of the law.  The Declaration also decried the practice of sending colonists back 
to English soil for trial. 
 The initial state constitutions, which reflected the same sentiments against 
concentrated executive power as the Articles of Confederation, typically divided the 
responsibilities of judicial appointments between governors and legislatures.  Legislatures 
utilized several tools to maintain their dominance over the judicial system.  Judges who 
rendered unpopular decisions might find themselves called before the legislature to 
explain themselves.  Legislatures would adjust the number of seats on courts, or, as the 
Jeffersonian coalition did at the national level in the early 1800s, eliminate a layer of the 
court system altogether.  State legislatures would also oversee state judiciaries by serving 
as the final redress of grievances, not unlike the British House of Lords.  The Rhode 




 Scott Gerber’s (2011)  history of judicial independence traces the U.S. 
Constitution’s prohibition against salary reductions to negative experiences with colonial 
courts.  Not infrequently, colonial legislatures would use salaries as a weapon to control 
judges.  However, the founding consensus on judicial independence reflected in Article 
III of the U.S. Constitution was not universally shared.  Jefferson’s conception of judicial 
independence thus mirrored the early state experiences: “A judge independent of a king 
or executive is a good thing; but independence of the will of the nation is a solecism, at 
least in a republican government.”  As James Monroe lamented to Jefferson: “The 
[Federalist] party had retreated into the judiciary” through John Adams’ midnight 
appointments, which took full advantage of the institutional protections of Article III.  As 
president, Jefferson favored a constitutional amendment that would redefine “good 
behavior” in terms that would allow presidential removal of judges upon 
recommendation of Congress for a much broader set of offenses than “treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors” (Tarr 2012).   
 Early courts thus faced powerful incentives to become captured either by strong 
governors or strong legislatures, and there is evidence that during this time period state 
courts were more deferential to legislatures (Sheldon 1999).  Following the Panic of 
1837, eight states defaulted on their debt, mostly because of overspending on toll road, 
railroad, and canal projects.  As a result, 16 states adopted new constitutions, and on the 
eve of the Civil War 24 of the 34 states elected their judges in partisan elections (Carbon 
and Berkson 1980, 9).  The reforms in judicial selection, coupled with strengthening the 




restore the balance of power in state politics (Tarr 2012).  In other words, despite the 
modern assumption that elected courts are less independent, judicial elections became a 
method to free courts from the potentially corrupting influence of legislative oversight. 
 Despite the fact that only three states employed judicial elections when he toured 
America, Alexis de Tocqueville (2003, 314) predicted in his typical, yet astonishingly 
prescient style that this move towards democratizing the judiciary would generate as 
much controversy as the system it replaced. He wrote, “sooner or later these innovations 
will have dire results and that one day it will be seen that by diminishing the magistrates’ 
independence, not judicial power only but the democratic republic itself has been 
attacked.”  However, the evidence from the early years of judicial elections, according to 
Jed Shugerman (2012), is that state courts were particularly aggressive in striking down 
laws. 
 By the turn of the century, however, the partisan nature of judicial elections 
turned from a potential virtue into a frequent vice.  Party machine control of politics 
extended to the nomination of judges, who were almost always party stalwarts (Tarr 
2012).  Progressive reformers, as part of their broader reform agenda, introduced 
nonpartisan elections in nine states by 1920, beginning with North Dakota.  Around the 
same time, the American Judicature Society developed an alternative method of 
insulating state judges from politics.  According to this model, judicial councils, 
comprised of judges would serve as a nominating body who would consider nominees on 
the grounds of professional, rather than partisan, qualifications.  At the end of the judge’s 




not to retain the judge in a noncompetitive election.  If a majority of voters decided not to 
retain a judge, the nominating council would select a new judge. 
 California became the first state to implement merit selection with retention 
elections in 1934, and by 1960, 15 other states had followed suit.  Much of the impetus 
for California’s reform came from a young Oakland prosecutor frustrated with 
widespread corruption scandals and rising crime rates in California.  This political 
newcomer wrote an article in the Chamber of Commerce’s California Journal of 
Development urging the state to get tough on crime by getting less partisan in its judicial 
selection.  The author’s name was Earl Warren (1934, as cited in Shugerman 2012).  
Following California’s adoption of merit selection, the American Bar Association, which 
had previously supported elections as a means of promoting judicial independence, 
endorsed its own version of merit selection, adding representatives from the legal 
community to judicial councils.  The first state to adopt this modified plan was Missouri, 
which is why merit selection with retention elections is often referred to as the Missouri 
Plan.  The spread of retention elections occurred mainly through rural states in the Great 
Plains.  
The evolution of state supreme court reappointment methods has followed some 
broad historical trends, but these institutional developments have not been universal.  
Why do some states change their selection methods and not others?  Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova (2002) question the typical historical narrative on this account and hypothesize 
that the motivating factor is political uncertainty.  When a ruling coalition in a state is 




institutional design choices.  Andrew Hanssen (2004) collected data on every change in 
state supreme court selection method between 1900 and 1990 and tested this hypothesis.  
His model found that states that tend to move to retention election systems have higher 
levels of two-party competition and greater differences between party platforms.  This 
hypothesis is also supported in comparative courts literature (Epstein, Knight, and 
Shvetsova 2001; Ginsburg 2003; Hirschl 2007). 
There are virtues and vices for each of these reappointment arrangements.  When 
elites are in charge of judicial reappointments, it relieves voters of the obligations of 
gathering information about judges to cast an informed ballot.  On the other hand, judges 
who are directly responsible to the people are more likely to strike down laws passed by 
the legislature than those responsible to elites (Langer 2002; Shugerman 2012).  Even the 
virtue of life tenure can turn into a vice – for example, when justices remain on the bench 
long after they are mentally capable of doing the job.   
 
Why Judicial Independence Matters 
 
 As Varnum so vividly demonstrates, judicial independence and rights protection 
are intimately connected.  If judges are worried about retaliation for unpopular decisions, 
it becomes difficult for them to “withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials” (West 
Virginia v. Barnette 1943, 638).  On the other hand, for half a century, legal theorists 
have pondered the problem posed by the U.S. Supreme Court when five politically 
unaccountable justices can strike down a law supported by 100+ million Americans.  This 




“countermajoritarian difficulty” is assumed to be a necessary tradeoff: Article III allows 
federal judges the leeway to counter the wishes of the majority by striking down a 
democratically-enacted law.   
Judicial independence could be used to protect underlying principles of 
constitutionalism, but it could also be used as a means of engaging in judicial tyranny 
(Ferejohn and Kramer 2002; Ferejohn 1998).  At the same time, accountability through 
judicial elections is also only instrumentally valuable to a deeper commitment to 
democracy (Bonneau and Hall 2009), but accountability could also undermine rule of law 
and separation of powers by turning courts into majoritarian institutions, rather than a 
forum to solve legal problems. 
 Unfortunately, as Burbank and Friedman (2002, 9) acknowledge: “[v]ery little of 
this work [on judicial independence] even acknowledges the existence of state courts, let 
alone considers how the variety of arrangements governing state judiciaries might affect 
general theories of judicial independence.”  One major problem in the judicial 
independence literature, according to Terri Peretti, is that “[w]e need precise measures of 
judicial independence and research that then tests its causes and consequences.  For 
example, we cannot simply assume that tenure and salary protection guarantee judicial 
independence” in everyday judicial practice (2002, 122–23).  Studying judicial 
independence at the state level will help political scientists gain a greater understanding 
of the diversity of state constitutional arrangements and the of these institutions on 
judicial decisionmaking in ways that an N = 1 study of the U.S. Supreme Court cannot 




scholars a chance to measure variation at the same point in time across most similar 
regions with contrasting institutional designs. 
Gaining additional empirical information about judicial independence can inform 
some much deeper normative questions, including: should a polity conceive of judges as 
“representatives of the people” or apolitical arbiters?  Who can be trusted to balance the 
competing normative ideals of rule of law democracy: the people, governors/legislators, 
or judges?  Which vice, judicial tyranny or a subservient judiciary, is more likely to 
occur, and which is more damaging to the health of a polity?   
 My dissertation will also serve a practical purpose.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
also ruled that judges have a due process obligation to recuse themselves when large 
campaign contributions pose a “risk of actual bias” (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 2009).  
When Hugh Caperton sued Massey Coal in 1998, a state trial court in West Virginia 
found for Caperton and ordered $50 million in damages.  The Supreme Court of Appeals 
(the highest court in West Virginia) reversed the decision and dismissed the case.  Prior 
to the high court ruling, Caperton asked Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself, as he 
had accepted $3 million in campaign contributions from the C.E.O. of Massey Coal.  
Justice Benjamin had narrowly upset a Democratic incumbent in 2004 in the (then) 
second most expensive judicial race in American history.  Since Caperton, fewer than a 
dozen states have reformed their recusal rules (Gibeaut 2012).  This dissertation will 
explore whether a case like this is an anomaly or a more prevalent problem.  Spending on 




among special interest groups (Goldberg 2009), which has led some state governments to 
experiment with public financing schemes for judicial candidates (Goldberg 2002). 
Since 1950, 28 states have changed their judicial selection methods (American 
Judicature Society 2013a).  Interest groups such as the American Judicature Society, the 
Brennan Center for Justice, and Justice at Stake (Goldberg 2008) have expressed major 
concerns about judicial elections, in large part because of their supposed impact on 
judicial independence, while experts at the Federalist Society (DeBow 2003) and the 
Heritage Foundation (O’Malley 2010) have spoken favorably about democratic 
accountability provided by judicial elections.  In November 2010, voters in Nevada voted 
against a ballot measure to adopt a retention election system in lieu of their current 
system of nonpartisan elections (Plant-Chirlin 2010).  Justice Louis Brandeis once 
famously called the states “laboratories of democracy” (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 
1932, 312).  This research would provide empirical evidence that could greatly inform 
this constitutional experimentation in the future.   
Organization of This Project 
  
 Chapter 2 outlines the different selection and retention methods currently used in 
the American states.  I offer definitions of judicial independence along two different 
dimensions and develop the theory of reappointment uncertainty from the resulting 
principal-agent problem.  After operationalizing the theory, the chapter considers several 
possible objections to and complications with using reappointment uncertainty to explain 




 Chapter Three proceeds to consider whether the polarizing role of partisanship is 
dependent on reappointment uncertainty.  At the same time, Chapter 3 develops a 
comprehensive theory of dissensus on state supreme courts.  This chapter, using a multi-
level probit model, examines whether justices are more likely to write a dissent when the 
ideological distance from the majority opinion writer increases.  The results indicate 
dissensus is structured on ideological grounds only in instance where reappointment 
uncertainty is high. 
Chapter Four analyzes the external pressure placed on state supreme courts by the 
governing coalition in a state.  Using a multi-level probit analysis of two major legal 
issues, this chapter analyzes the degree to which reappointment uncertainty affects the 
responsiveness of state supreme court justices to changes in the ideology of a state’s 
governing coalition.  The only instance in which a state supreme court mirrors changes in 
state-level ideology is in nonpartisan election states, where reappointment uncertainty is 
high. 
 Chapter Five turns to an emerging problem among those state supreme courts that 
reelect their judges – that of campaign finance.  This chapter begins with a recent history 
of campaign finance in judicial elections.  Then, the chapter utilizes an instrumental-
variables probit analysis to diagnose the role of campaign contributions in shaping 
judicial decisions, specifically donations from persons working in different sectors of the 
business community and lawyers.  The analysis suggest that there is an endogeneity 
problem, and, once solved for using a variety of instrumental variables, there is a direct 




 Chapter Six concludes this project with a reflection on the normative implications 
of the data analysis.  Given the frequency with which states redesign their constitutional 
orders (Council on State Governments 2012; Levinson 2012), this is more than just an 
academic question.  In light of the evidence presented in this dissertation, complemented 
by the findings in other studies of state supreme courts, I lay out a case in favor of the 
Missouri plan of merit selection and retention elections. 
The conclusion also discusses how scholars should view state supreme courts 
within debates of democratic theory.  Democratic constitutionalism may rest on the 
consent of the governed, but that does not automatically mean that any temporary 
factional passion (Madison 2010) should be accommodated.  Taken to the extreme, 
judicial independence can produce a countermajoritarian difficulty, but judicial 
accountability taken to the extreme could result in a subservient judiciary.   
 Bonneau and Hall (Bonneau and Hall 2009) focus on judicial elections as a 
mechanism to achieve popular constitutionalism, but they do not acknowledge alternate 
avenues for the people (or their elected representatives) to maintain supremacy in 
determining constitutional meaning.   Constitutional amendment or calling a new 
constitutional convention can accomplish the goals of popular constitutionalism without 
disrupting the rule of law through the threat of sanction for judges who refuse to toe the 
line.  Amending or abandoning a constitution represents a deeper-throated expression of 
the voice of “We the People” because the procedures by which this change is 
accomplished are more rigorous than getting 50 percent plus one of the public (or the 




relevant today as it was in his day: the promise of American constitutionalism is 





Chapter Two: Reappointment Uncertainty, Institutional Design, and Judicial 
Independence 
 
At present it will be sufficient to remark that no citizen of Virginia can be prejudiced 
either in his person or his property, by any of the government of this commonwealth (or 
of the United States) so long as the judiciary departments of those governments, 
respectively, remain uncorrupt, and independent of legislative or executive control.  But 
whenever the reverse of this happens, by whatever means it may be effected (whether 
fear or favour), liberty will be no more, and property but a shadow. 
 
      St. George Tucker (1803, as cited in Tarr 2012) 
.   
The State of State Supreme Courts 
 
Tables 2.1, 2.2., and 2.3 present information on all 50 state courts and features of 
their different judicial election systems.  Partisan judicial elections are similar to elections 
for other political offices.  The partisan label on the ballot provides voters valuable 
information for their vote choice, which explains why voter roll-off in these races is 
typically much lower (Bonneau and Hall 2009).  Partisan elections are even more 
common for state trial court judges; currently 19 states use partisan elections for at least 
some of their judges (Shepherd 2013, 4).  Nonpartisan judicial elections vary a bit more: 
Michigan and Ohio hold partisan primaries to determine the two nominees who appear on 
the general election ballot without party identification.5  The rest of these states allow 
candidates on the general election ballot without formal input from either party.  Recent 
studies have demonstrated some evidence that voters can tell relevant ideological 
5 While Bonneau and Hall (2009) classify these two states as having partisan elections, I disagree.  Most 
voters do not participate in primaries, and therefore they lose a significant amount of information by not 
having the party affiliation listed on the ballot at the general election.  I would use the same logic to 
disagree with these authors’ on classifying Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania as partisan election 
states.  While these three states do select their freshman justices through partisan elections, incumbent 
justices are reelected through retention elections, and the literature suggests that the retention audience is 
more important to judges (Savchak and Barghothi 2007).  In addition the analysis presented in Chapter 3 
demonstrates that justices in these three states behave more like retention election judges than judges 
responsible to a political party. 
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differences between candidates  (Bonneau and Cann 2012) and that these races are often 
driven by political considerations (Hall 2001).   
One reason why voters can often overcome the information disadvantage posed 
by nonpartisan elections is a recent change in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine.  In 
Minnesota v. White (2002), the Court ruled that state bar association restrictions on 
judicial candidates violated the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.  Because of 
the decision, candidates are free to discuss the ideological or partisan affiliations (even in 
states with nonpartisan judicial elections).  In many states, judicial candidates are even 
free to make commitments on controversial issues (Caufield 2009).  While increased 
spending on judicial elections has provided a larger quantity of information to voters, the 
White decision also led to an increase in the quality of information (Baum and Klein 
2009; Hojnacki and Baum 1992).     
Retention elections allow voters to decide whether to reappoint a sitting justice 
who appears on the ballot without an opponent.  In this system, there is always a 
difference between the method in which justices achieve their first term and retention for 
any subsequent term.  Most states that utilize retention elections initially select their 
justices through a merit system.  According to a study compiled by the American 
Judicature Society, judges in retention elections are opposed on a variety of different 
grounds including: professional competence, judicial philosophy, judicial conduct and 
temperament (all common reasons), issuing controversial decisions, criminal activity and 
scandals (less common reasons) (Carbon and Berkson 1980).  Voters often lack 




decision.  In the absence of a meaningful alternative (an opposing candidate) or evidence 
of maladministration, and given the level of trust that judges enjoy in the American 
democratic order (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), the default option for most voters 
may be to retain judges. 
Most of the states with any of these three reappointment methods conduct 
statewide, single-seat elections, while a few others create judicial districts (like legislative 
districts) or conduct multimember seat elections.  In Illinois, New Mexico, and 
Pennsylvania, state supreme court justices initially run in a partisan election, but at the 
end of each of their terms, they are subject to a retention election.  Incumbents in Illinois 
need 60 percent of the vote to retain office, and justices in New Mexico need to claim at 
least a 57 percent share of the vote.  Twenty-two states, including those with and without 
judicial elections, utilize a mandatory retirement age for judges.  In several states, the 
government or nonprofit organizations distribute (or make available) a guide to provide 
voters with more information about the qualifications and public statements of judicial 
candidates. 
Other states, mostly part of the original 13 colonies, do not conduct judicial 
elections.  These states require judges to be periodically renominated by the governor and 
reconfirmed by the state legislature, but in four states, the governor plays no formal role 
in the selection or retention of judges.  As Table 1.2 demonstrates, judges in 
reconfirmation states enjoy high levels of job security, which seems a bit puzzling in light 
of the politicized nature of judicial confirmations on the federal bench (Binder 2009).  




Five of the seven states that have elite actors reapprove judges impose mandatory 
retirement ages, and in those states, freshmen judges tend to reach to the bench close to 
that retirement age.6  The average freshman state supreme court justice appointed in 
Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Virginia, or Vermont between 
1980-1997 would only be eligible to serve 1.76 terms.  This means that, on average, 
judicial turnover is fairly high in these states, which may provide the incentives necessary 
for promoting judicial job security.  State legislators and governors may be willing to 
reapprove nominees of an ancien regime if they know that the effects of that decision 
would be short lasting. 
Five of the seven utilize judicial nominating commissions to present the governor 
with a short list of candidates.7  Because these commissions select nominees on merit, it 
becomes very difficult for legislators or governors to anticipate whether the refusal to 
reapprove a sitting judge will lead to the nomination and approval of a new judge who is 
any more faithful an agent than her predecessor.  Beyond these strategic calculations, 
there may be benefits in terms of legitimacy and collegiality that governors and 
legislators accrue by acting in such a cooperative fashion.  Governor Chris Christie of 
New Jersey, a Republican, recently broke with tradition by refusing to reappoint an 
incumbent justice for his second term because he was a Democrat, a decision which 
sparked considerable outcry from the Democratically-controlled legislature (Pérez-Peña 
2010).   
6 The other two states are Delaware and Maine (American Judicature Society 2013e).  The average 
freshman justice appointed in these states between 1980-1997 took her seat on the bench at age 53.1, which 
is slightly (but not statistically significantly) higher than the national average of 52.8 during the same 
period. 
7 The other two states are Maine and Virginia (American Judicature Society 2013d). 
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Interestingly, only a handful of states have created anything  even resembling life 
tenure for judges.  In New Jersey, state supreme court justices achieve life tenure 
(through age 70) upon being renominated and reconfirmed once.  The reappointment of 
Hawaiian state supreme court justices is the sole responsibility of their judicial 
commission, and the commission’s criteria for removal of judges are more akin to the 
standards for the impeachment of judges.  Massachusetts and New Hampshire grant life 
tenure to judges, subject to a mandatory retirement age.8  Rhode Island, despite being the 
most vocal opponent to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, is the only state in the 
union that grants life tenure akin to Article III.9 
 
Judicial Independence as a Concept 
 
What, precisely, is judicial independence?  Why would we expect it to be a 
meaningful part of a democratic constitutional order, given that law is a social enterprise?  
How could political scientists observe independence in nature?  Of whom are judges 
supposed to be independent, and why would such a separation be normatively desirable?  
As Alan Tarr (2012) has stated: “Defenders [of judicial independence] have tended to be 
long on pieties and short on precision.”  Thus, the project begins by fashioning a 
definition of judicial independence along two dimensions.10   
8 Despite the presence of a mandatory retirement age, Massachussets and New Hampshire are referred to in 
this project as states with life tenure for easy of terminology. 
9 Yet the structure of the Rhode Island judiciary is not exactly like Article III because judicial nominees 
must be confirmed by both houses of the legislature, and the governor can only nominate a candidate 
presented on a slate from the state judicial commission. 
10 In the comparative context, Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2009) test the validity of thirteen different judicial 
independence measures, which tap into two dimensions: de jure and de facto independence.  The de facto 
independence measures are further deconstructed in terms of measures of judicial power and autonomy.  
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Institutional judicial independence refers to rules and norms designed to isolate 
courts from outside influence.  State constitutions provide courts with a number of forms 
of institutional independence.  These institutions include: salary protection, merit 
selection of judges, fixed jurisdiction, a fixed number of judges on a court, and, most 
importantly, tenure of office: whether for life or until a mandatory retirement age (Brinks 
and Blass 2010).   
Impeachment is a tricky accountability measure because it may or may not 
function in a similar fashion as voters or legislators behave in making reappointment 
decisions.  Article III of the U.S. Constitution defines the term of office for federal judges 
as during “good behavior,” which, today, essentially means life tenure.  In early state 
constitutions, the term good behavior referred to a standard of good conduct in office 
(Tarr 2012).  Many early constitutions also created grounds for impeachment that were 
much broader than today.  For example, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 
includes “maladministration in office” as an impeachable offense.  Many of the voters in 
Iowa who wanted to oust the members of their supreme court for legalizing gay marriage 
would likely conceive of their votes along the lines of maladministration.   
However, not all supporters of retention elections think that citizens ought to use 
their vote in such a fashion.  Political scientist and American Judicature Society officer 
Rachel Caufield argued that the Missouri plan system, which created judicial retention 
elections, was intended to allow citizens to remove judges only for nonideological 
The measures of de jure independence roughly map onto my notion of institutional independence, while 
measures of judicial autonomy correspond to my conceptualization of decisional independence. 
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reasons (Deffelmeyer 2011).  This is a curious argument, however, considering the Iowa 
Constitution allows for judges to be impeached (1857).  According to data collected by 
Bratton, Spill, and Sill (2012), no state supreme court justice has been removed from 
office through the impeachment process since at least 1950. 
Decisional Independence 
 
A judge renders an independent decision when she considers only factors that are 
internal to the rule of law.  Key rule of law considerations include a commitment to stare 
decisis, adherence to the canons of statutory interpretation, a proper application of 
doctrine to particular case facts, and handling only those issues properly raised and 
minimally necessary to decide a case (Kmiec 2004).  Developed by James Gibson (1978), 
judicial role theory posits that judges see themselves as tasked with certain obligations, 
including that of impartiality.  Subsequent research has argued that these perceived roles 
are dependent on the institutional context in which they serve (Carman 2012).  
Attitudinalist political scientists (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002) and hard line legal realist 
law professors (e.g., Frank 1973) would argue that the rule of law is a fiction.  Regardless 
of whether that is an empirically valid conclusion, judges think it exists and attempt to 
fulfill their role in order to pursue it.   
Judicial independence relies on a notion of sincerity.  Appellate courts often deal 
with hard cases in which more than one plausible solution is present under traditional 
legal variables such as following precedent (Cardozo 1922).  Judges who view the law 




the law – as they see it.  The normative concern about judicial non-independence is 
judges will change their behavior to reflect the contrary views of outside actors.   
While this definition of decisional independence might seem to lack much 
precision, each quantitative chapter of the dissertation will operationalize, and measure, a 
different example of decisional independence.  I define independence as a continuous, 
rather than a discrete variable.  The largest disadvantage of defining decisional 
independence dichotomously is that it sets up a straw man.  Every judicial system in the 
United States is set up to not only allow, but also encourage, some outside influence.  No 
one would say, for instance, that the filing of amicus curiae briefs undermines judicial 
independence.  Outside influence occurs when third parties send signals to a court (Rubin 
2002); these signals range from legal and ethical options like newspaper editorials to 
questionable tactics, such as making undue threats of impeachment, or even illegal 
signals like offering bribes.  If signals from third parties are ever present, it might seem 
like the only way to achieve judicial independence would be to lock judges in a dungeon.  
This is both unrealistic and normatively unsatisfying.11 
Conversely, the main disadvantage to a continuous conceptualization of judicial 
independence is that it becomes difficult to define where on the continuum independence 
ends and non-independence begins.  Studying state supreme courts partially remedies this 
problem, however, because scholars can make relative comparisons of independence 
between different states.  Independence is a problem of optimization, not maximization.  
Over the course of American history, each of these reappointment methods developed in 
11 One could distinguish, however, between an amicus brief and an impeachment threat in that the former is 
purely a soft-power form of persuasion, while the latter is not. 
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the hopes of striking a balance between some form of judicial accountability (from 
impeachment to electoral defeat) and decisional independence. 
Reappointment Uncertainty and Judicial Independence 
 
The problem with most of the existing state court studies of judicial independence 
is a lack of rich theorizing.  For example, Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2010) seem to think 
that reappointment methods might have something to do with principal-agent theory, but 
they provide no clear reasons how different reappointment structures alter the incentives 
for the agents.  Similarly, Brace and Boyea (2008) assume that all forms of election form 
the same decisional incentives and that there were no meaningful differences between 
tenured justice and untenured ones.   
 Other state supreme court scholars have devoted more careful attention to the 
decisional consequences of institutional arrangements.  Laura Langer (2002, 2003)12 
develops a theory of judicial review on state supreme courts that reflects the principal-
agent problem facing justices.  Justices who are reconfirmed by legislators and governors 
are more reluctant to strike down laws than justices who are directly accountable to the 
people because principals who are governing elites are likely more sensitive to this type 
of judicial behavior.  Scott Comparato (2003) finds that amicus curiae briefs 
communicate more policy information in state with judicial elections and more 
information regarding the preferences of the other branches of government in states with 
legislative or gubernatorial reappointment.  This interest group strategy provides judges 
with the most useful information for their respective retention methods. 
12 See also Brace, Hall, and Langer (1998). 
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The appointment of judges represents a potential principal-agent problem.  There 
two types of principals in this game: the public and elites (mostly political parties, 
governors, and legislatures).  The principal must be concerned with the possibility of 
shirking on the part of the agent, which can arise when there is a divergence between the 
preferences of the two parties.  In this context, the principals are looking to ensure that 
the justices they appoint or elect issue decisions with which they will agree.  This 
assumption is supported in the federal judicial politics literature (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 
2002; but see Tribe 1985).   
Principals, essentially, have two tools with which to accomplish these goals: the 
initial screening process by which agents are selected and on-the-job monitoring 
(elections and reappointments).  The first limits the potential for adverse selection (Moe 
1995), which occurs when principals lack information of the preferences of agents.  
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002), 
states were free to restrict the types of discussions and promises that judicial candidates 
made, which could exacerbate the problem of adverse selection.  This information gap 
should disappear as first-time candidates demonstrate their preferences as incumbents.  
The presence of a partisan label on the ballot should reduce the potential for adverse 
selection compared to justices running in nonpartisan election.  However a recent study 
(Bonneau and Cann 2012) demonstrates voters are able to infer the ideology of 
nonpartisan judicial candidates. 
Lewis Kornhauser (2002, 53) has argued: “[C]oncepts of judicial independence 




isolation or in relation to other political or social institutions.”  There is some evidence 
for this statement from the federal judicial politics literature.  Over the course of 
American history, such a disagreement between elites in Washington and members of the 
U.S. Supreme Court has not existed to much of a meaningful degree, according to these 
authors.  This feature of American political development is likely not a failure of life 
tenure and salary protection to insulate the justices to the point that they feel free to 
disagree with the ruling coalition.  It is more likely that this constitutional consensus is 
the result of an appointment process that has secured faithful agent judges.   
On-the-job monitoring limits moral hazard with the threat of punishment.  There 
are several different variables in the monitoring system: the length of judicial terms, the 
type of behavior considered legitimate grounds for dismissal, whether dismissing a 
justice and appointing a replacement is a one-stage or two-stage process, and the amount 
and type of information about past behavior presented to principals at the time of the 
decision.  The most important consequence of the principal-agent problem is that 
different reappointment systems create different levels of job security.   
Jed Shugerman (2012) breaks the question of judicial independence into two 
dimensions: relative independence (freedom from whom?) and general independence 
(how much independence?).  Reappointment methods structure both dimensions of his 
concept.  When political elites serve as principals, they may be less likely to suffer from 
adverse selection because they will have greater knowledge about their agents before they 
are appointed.  They also may do a better job of reducing moral hazard because it is 




methods also establish levels of general independence by specifying the length of a 
judicial term, the threshold for removal from office, etc. 
The fact that multiple principals play a role in appointing agent judges makes the 
game more complicated (Waterman and Meier 1998).  In the case of states with elite 
reconfirmation, it is fair to assume an equal level of information between the principals - 
the governor and the chambers of the legislature.  The principal-agent literature suggests 
that in these situations that if these different principals have differing preferences that it 
leaves room for the agents to professionalize (Moe 1985).  In the case of partisan 
elections, there is an informational asymmetry between party elites who nominate a 
candidate and the voters who choose in the general election.  It would be tempting to 
think that this asymmetry would make party elites the more important principal, but the 
high reappointment uncertainty in partisan elections is more likely a function of a 
skeptical general electorate. 
These considerations lead to the key prediction:   
Reappointment uncertainty theory: assuming justices are rational actors, 
their behavior will be constrained by the divergent preferences of outside 
actors in relation to the level of reappointment uncertainty they face. 
 
Gary Jacobson (1987) found that members of Congress “run scared” – that is they 
never think of themselves as electorally invulnerable, despite the fact that many of them 
essentially are.  Members of Congress, according to the author, campaign hard and put 
great effort into constituency services, even if their next election seems assured.  
Legislative scholars continue to debate whether this hypothesis is valid (Hirano and 




logic motivating the theory seems plausible in the context of state supreme courts.  Huber 
and Gordon (2004) have demonstrated that trial court judges in Pennsylvania facing 
retention elections become more punitive in their criminal sentencing as their election 
date nears, regardless of their underlying judicial ideology. 
Congressional elections are much higher information affairs than judicial 
elections (Schaffner and Diascro 2009), although recent increases in judicial campaign 
spending may be mitigating this problem by making these elections more high-profile 
(Hall and Bonneau 2008).  In judicial elections with two opposing candidates, 
experienced challengers tend to fare better against incumbent judges, and voters appear to 
be cognizant of candidate qualifications (Hall and Bonneau 2006). 
In applying principal-agent theory to congressional monitoring of the 
bureaucracy, Weingast and Moran (1983) confronted a paradox: why would bureaucrats 
feels constrained by the threat of congressional oversight when Congress does relatively 
little of it?  Bureaucrats, instead, conform to congressional expectations in order to 
achieve budgetary incentives and avoid the threat of ex post investigations.  The threat of 
sanction to judges exists everywhere, even in states with life tenure because of the 
possibility of impeachment.  However, impeachment is not much of a credible threat.  
Which threats are considered credible is a function of institutional context and communal 
norms. 
Americans have historically opposed sanctioning the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
often then go to the polls that November and vote a state judge out of office.  How does 




branches of government?  The U.S. Supreme Court probably enjoys higher levels of 
diffuse support than state supreme courts, given its higher visibility.  The larger answer 
concerns established norms of political behavior.  Retaliations against the U.S. Supreme 
Court, of any sort, are very rare, but judicial elections happen on a regular basis.  
Although both are sanctioned forms of accountability within the constitutional order, 
impeaching a U.S. Supreme Court justice would likely be seen as so uncommon as to be 
inappropriate, whereas voting out a state court judge would be seen as common enough 
to be considered appropriate.  If a state cut the salaries of their justices in the wake of an 
unpopular decision – which is a legal option in many states – the people of that state 
would likely be skeptical because it is an uncommon punishment. 
 
Operationalizing Judicial Independence: Institutions and External Pressures 
 
If judicial independence exists, how would political scientists observe and 
quantify it?  As Lewis Kornhauser (2002, 52) observes, “Judicial independence…is not 
directly observable.  In empirical studies, then, the analyst has to use some proxy for 
independence.”  Judicial independence is even trickier than many other abstract concepts 
in political science because, over the course of American history, the same institutions 
that established to promote decisional independence have sometimes evolved into 
external pressures that could undermine judicial independence (Shugerman 2012).  
 Assuming that state supreme court justices are rational actors who wish to keep 
their jobs, they will make judicial decisions in ways that will balance their competing 




outside actors who pose a threat to their reappointment.  The degree to which they 
attempt to be faithful agents to their principals depends on how those external pressures 
filter through each state’s reappointment method.  Figure 1.1 outlines this relationship 
and its impact on judicial decisionmaking.   
 Decisional independence occurs when the institutions designed to promote 
independence blunt these external pressures, thereby ensuring that the resulting decision 
reflects legal considerations.  Figure 2.2 illustrates a hypothetical example of institutional 
independence producing decisional independence.  Political parties, the mass public, and 
interest groups all have strong preferences – as represented by the bold lines emanating 
from those actors – about the outcome of judicial decisions.  However, none of those 
actors writes judicial decisions directly.  Their goals must be achieved indirectly through 
the justices serving on their state supreme court.  The mediation of that influence take 
place within an institution (this example utilizes partisan elections).  Note that despite the 
strong preferences going into the judges’ decisionmaking process, the resulting influence 
from those outside actors is quite small – as represented by the thin line connected to 
judicial decisions.  The change in the thickness of those causal arrows is the result of a 
well-functioning institution designed to promote judicial independence.  As a result, the 
justice is much more strongly influenced by the rule of law – as represented by the bold 
line connecting the law to judicial decisions. 
Courts, though part of the broader political order (McCloskey 2004), are also 
unique institutions, designed to be neutral arbiters who can resolve disputes between two 




system of justice (Shapiro 1986).  None of the actors listed at the left of Figure 2.1 are 
included in triadic dispute resolution system.  Quantifying the relationships outlined in 
Figure 2.1 constitutes the goal of the analytical portion of this dissertation.  The following 
hypotheses are derived from the historical analysis developed earlier in this chapter and 
in reaction to the existing political science research on judicial independence on state 
supreme courts. 
Party Polarization Hypothesis 
 
 Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2010, 296) argued, “Judges have the duty to enforce the 
law impartially, without regard to the legally irrelevant characteristics of the litigants or 
the goals of political parties.”  When judges are not only responsible to the law, but also 
to voters, and a political party as well, the incentive structure for judicial decisionmaking 
likely changes as well.  States in which partisanship is not a relevant qualification for 
holding judicial office might plausibly end up with judges who do not issue decisions 
along ideological lines, whereas judges who must seek renomination might feel 
compelled to send signals to party elites. 
 The decision to dissent or join a majority coalition is a function of different 
policy, strategic, and institutional considerations (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 
2000).  After taking into account the legal arguments and other institutional norms, every 
justice (save for the one assigned to write the majority opinion) must decide what to do 
with her vote.  Is the decision to dissent is structured on partisan lines?  While the federal 
appellate court literature seems to answer “yes” to this question (Hettinger, Lindquist, 




institutional differences between these courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, where 
partisanship (or ideology) matters even more.  State supreme courts, where institutional 
design varies much more wildly, can provide valuable insights as to the different 
incentives presented to judges in different principal-agent relationships. 
Party Polarization Hypothesis: The degree to which partisan differences 
structure judicial decisionmaking on a state supreme court depends on the 
degree of reappointment uncertainty those justices face. 
 
Governing Coalition Capture Hypothesis 
 
 Scholars beginning with Robert Dahl (1957) and continuing onward (Barnum 
1985; Friedman 2009; Graber 1993; McCloskey 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004; 
Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Powe 2009; Rosenberg 1992; Whittington 2005) would, to 
some degree, challenge the meaningfulness of judicial independence.  The literature on 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not revealed much disagreement with the dominant ruling 
coalition over time.  Nonetheless, the relationship between the preferences of the ruling 
coalition and high courts deserves reevaluation in the context of differing institutional 
designs. 
 When a judge votes in a way consistent with how she sees the law is an example 
of judicial independence.  Altering that decisionmaking calculus in order to conform to 
changing preferences of the ruling coalition is an example of non-independence.  
However, when job security is high, judges will not feel much pressure to do so.  Thus, 





Governing Coalition Capture Hypothesis: State supreme court justices 
change the ideological direction of their judicial decisions to follow 
changes in the ideological direction of the political environment in their 
state only to the degree to which they face reappointment uncertainty. 
 
Interest Group Capture Hypothesis  
 
 Unlike the first three hypotheses, interest groups are not part of the constitutional 
design that appoints or reappoints state supreme court justices.  However, the normative 
implications of interest group capture are perhaps even more dangerous than other forms.  
Most of the congressional literature that examines the role of money in politics has not 
found strong evidence of a quid pro quo relationship between contributor and legislator 
(see Stratmann 2005). Recent scholarship on money in state politics (Powell 2012), on 
the other hand, reveals a much different picture: the more money legislators raise, the 
more she accommodates her donors at the expense of her constituents in her policy 
decisions.  Early scholarly investigations into the role of money in judicial elections 
(Bonneau and Cann 2009; Cann 2007; McCall 2003) have also demonstrated that some 
justices are influenced by lawyers who contribute and then appear in their courtroom.  
There is also evidence that higher levels of campaign spending drive electoral success in 
judicial elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009). 
 The incentive structure established by reappointment institutions may differ in 
this analysis compared to the others undertaken in this dissertation.  Candidates in 
partisan judicial elections, though they enjoy the lowest level of job security, also 
automatically enjoy the highest amount of free information conveyed to voters at the 




example, voters are unhappy with a justice’s party at the national level.  Party 
identification is also an important signal to potential campaign contributors as well.  With 
more information about a candidate’s probable future behavior, contributors discount the 
utility of a contribution if the contributor’s interests are strongly at odds with the 
worldview of the candidate. 
 Justices in nonpartisan elections have to overcome the lack of information on the 
ballot and identify their worldview with voters through other means (Canes-Wrone, 
Clark, and Park 2012; Canes-Wrone and Clark 2009).  This could make the necessity of 
raising money more important in these races than in partisan election races.  If money is a 
more important consideration for these candidates, they may be more willing to 
accommodate the interests of their contributors.  Moreover, since there is no oversight 
from either political party, justices in nonpartisan elections may feel as though these 
accommodations are less likely to be noticed.  Justices in partisan election states must 
fend off the threat of a primary challenge, which could mean that faced between 
following the interest of a campaign contributor and voting in a way to please their party, 
assuming they conflict, partisan considerations might triumph.  Many justices in partisan 
elections states have used their service on state supreme courts as a stepping-stone to 
campaigns for governor, state attorney general, and U.S. House and Senate.  Their 
primary concern may be upward mobility, not remaining on the bench. 
 The largest obstacle to measuring this relationship is the classic “chicken and 
egg” problem that confronts any study of campaign finance.  Instrumental variables 




find variables correlated with the incentive to donate to any candidate, no matter what 
their ideological inclinations might be.  The campaign finance literature has demonstrated 
that contributors are rational (Wright 1996) – that is, they not only want to maximize the 
chance that the candidates they back will in turn back them, but they also want to invest 
in candidates who are likely to win.  The advantage provided by incumbency reduces this 
uncertainty for contributors, which makes freshman versus non-freshman justices a 
promising starting point for an instrumental variables analysis. 
Interest Group Capture Hypothesis: Justices will adjust their voting 
behavior in the ideological direction sought by their contributions only if 




 The empirical analysis for this project relies mostly on data from the State 
Supreme Court Data Project  (Brace and Hall 2001).  This comprehensive dataset 
includes 21,000 decisions from over 400 state supreme court justices from all 50 states 
between 1995 and 1998.  The principal investigators have found their data to be both 
reliable and valid (Brace and Hall 1998).  This same dataset also includes important 
biographical data on all of the justices sitting on state supreme courts during this time.  
Further biographical information is provided in the State Supreme Court Career Database 
(Bratton, Spill, and Sill 2012).  Additional features of state judicial systems and other 
valuable state-level political data comes from the State Politics and the Judiciary dataset 
(Lindquist 2010).  Finally, data on campaign contributions in judicial elections comes 
from the National Center on Money in State Politics (2012).  Data on two-party 





Potential Problems with Reappointment Uncertainty 
Decisional Independence without Institutional Independence? 
 
The traditional assumption of the principal-agent theory of judicial 
decisionmaking is that judges behave according to a rational calculation of self-interest 
(Epstein and Posner 2013; Murphy 1964).  In the context of state supreme courts, this 
assumption translates into a desire be reelected or reappointed, if applicable.  It is 
possible, though, that judges who must be periodically reappointed will behave 
independently even when profound differences in constitutional worldviews exist 
between judges and reappointing agents.  Helmke and Staton (2011) develop a formal 
model that demonstrates that increasing judicial tenure can actually lead to more 
deferential courts because it increases the degree to which judges value their seats.  In 
other words, if judges view their appointment more as a less desirable “temp job” than a 
very rewarding and life-long career, justices might be more willing to risk losing it by 
issuing an unpopular, but (in their minds) correct opinion.   
 Thus, institutional independence might be neither necessary nor sufficient to spur 
decisional independence.  There is some early evidence from early American history that 
might support this claim.  Scott Gerber’s (2011) study of colonial and state courts found 
the first example of judicial review being invoked occurred in New Jersey in 1780, 
despite the fact that the New Jersey Constitution at the time did not protect judicial 




warrants further scholarly investigation, and the diversity of institutional structures that 
exist at the state level, both then and now, provide an excellent laboratory. 
Selection Effects, Not Reappointment Effects 
 
Because different actors select justices across the states, justices might be 
appointed for different reasons.  Judicial nominating commissions may seek candidates 
who possess objective merit,13 while political parties that nominate judges may be 
looking for faithful agents of a party platform.  Research into judicial role theory 
demonstrates that justices in states with different institutional environments have 
differing notions of the acceptability of judicial activism (Carman 2012).  It is plausible 
to think that levels of judicial independence would vary across states, not because of 
differences in reappointment uncertainty, but because differing principals appoint or elect 
justices with different conceptions of the judicial role.  In other words, selection matters, 
reappointment does not.   
Much of the existing literature on state supreme courts makes this assumption.  
For example, Bonneau and Hall classify (2009) Illinois, Pennsylvania as partisan 
elections states because that is how freshman justices are chosen.  However, incumbents 
are reappointed the bench through retention elections, which are much friendlier to 
incumbent protection than a competitive, partisan election.  The American Judicature 
Society (2013e) takes the assumption a step further.   They classify Ohio and Michigan as 
1313 Supporters of judicial elections (Bonneau 2013b) are quick to cite Professor Brian Fitzpatrick’s article 
(2009) suggesting that judicial commissions nominate candidates that are dramatically more liberal than 
their state’s median voter.  However, this study is based on data from two states (Tennessee and Missouri) 
during a timeframe in which a strong Democratic party coalition controlled state government.  In addition, 
the study only attempts to infer the ideology of justices based on incomplete data of their campaign 
contributions and party primary participation, rather than analyzing their behavior on the bench. 
36 
 
                                               
  
states with partisan elections because they have party primaries, despite the fact that they 
appear on the November ballot without party identification.  On the other hand, Savchak 
and Barghothi (2007) present evidence that state supreme court behavior is more of a 
product of reappointment method than initial selection method. 
How should political scientists untangle this messy web of incentive structures?  
Are state supreme court justices more forward looking or products of their past?  One 
methodological technique that can assist is using random slopes in multi-level models 
(Gelman and Hill 2007).  Using reappointment methods as a second level allows the 
relationship between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable to differ across 
groups independently.  Random slopes have potential to yield unbiased coefficients 
representing conceptualizations of judicial independence.  This technique would also be 
useful in allowing the influence of partisanship to vary independently across different 
reappointment methods.  Thus, random slopes allow for comparisons within a group of 
state about which variables are doing the most work: levels of partisanship that are the 
product of a selection system or levels of uncertainty associated with reappointment. 
Considering Other Factors of State Politics 
 
Even if there is a relationship between job security and decisional independence, 
it could exist along dimensions other than reappointment method.  Perhaps the political 
culture in states without protections of judicial salaries is more anti-incumbent than in 
others.  Judges in states with mandatory retirement ages might behave more 
independently than other judges because of the decreasing utility of their tenure.  States 




security for state supreme court justices.  Job security could also plausibly be a function 
of the level of two-party competition in a state.  States that have long-term stability in 
their political coalitions might be less inclined to remove judges as well as those states 
with more one-party dominance.   
To test these alternate specifications of job security, I construct a model analyzing 
what factors in state-level politics influence the number of incumbent justices defeated 
who were seeking reappointment between 1980 and 1997.  Table 2.4 describes the 
variables in greater detail.14  Because the dependent variable is a count, negative 
binomial regression is appropriate.  I assume a lack of statistical independence in this 
model, as multiple incumbents are often on the ballot in a state in the same year.  As 
terms of office vary state-to-state, the number of judges is included as an exposure term.  
States with partisan elections serve as the baseline reappointment category. 
The results of the regression, presented in Table 2.5, suggest that when 
reappointment methods are held constant the other features of state-level politics do not 
drive incumbent job security.  The only variable outside of the several reappointment 
methods that approaches conventional levels of statistical significance is Judicial Recall 
(p = 0.058), though the coefficient is in the opposite direction than predicted.  That is, 
states with judicial recall election procedures tend to defeat slightly fewer incumbent 
justices seeking reappointment than other states.  Reappointment methods, on the other 
hand, are strongly associated with levels of incumbent defeat.15  While there is no 
14 The variables for Party Competition Mean and Variance use Berry (1998) elite ideology scores rather 
than Ranney (1965) scores because the latter are not available for many state-years during the timeframe 
analyzed. 
15 Running the same model with those states included does not yield substantively different results. 
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statistically significant difference in the number of defeats between states with partisan 
elections (the baseline) and states with nonpartisan elections, justices in states with 
retention elections, and elite reconfirmation are much less likely to suffer defeats.  The 
standard error for life tenure states is so high because there is no variation, as no justice 





Chapter Three: Party Polarization on State Supreme Courts 
 
In the early 1990s, large corporate interests began buying control of many of our state 
Supreme Courts and many of our lower courts…Our aim is to bring Democratic and 
progressive groups together to combat the corporate takeover of our state appellate 
courts. 
 
Democratic Judicial Campaign Committee (2013) 
 
 
 In the spring of 2011, the eyes of the media, interest groups, and operatives from 
both parties focused on Wisconsin, where newly elected Governor Scott Walker (R) 
attempted to eliminate collective bargaining rights for state employees.  After a 
protracted battle with Democrats in the state legislature, Walker’s proposal passed.  Both 
sides prepared themselves for a battle in the courts over the measure’s legality.  At the 
same time, a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, former Republican state legislator 
David Prosser, was facing reelection.  The nonpartisan election between Justice Prosser 
and Assistant Attorney General JoAnne Kloppenburg was viewed as a referendum on 
Governor Walker and his agenda (Davey 2011).   
 After a hard-fought and expensive campaign (“Tainting Justice With Politics” 
2011), Chief Justice Prosser narrowly won another term on the court.  Conservative 
interest groups lined up behind Prosser’s campaign because of his past partisan activity 
and his voting record on the court.  Why did liberal groups flock to Kloppenburg?  Her 
liberal credentials were much less clear: she had served as a Wisconsin assistant attorney 
general under an equal number of Republican and Democratic attorneys general, and she 
had no elected or judicial experience.  Besides, the intention of nonpartisan elections is to 
remove the saliency of partisanship (Carbon and Berkson 1980) – Kloppenburg was 




 Liberal groups assumed that Kloppenburg would cast more liberal votes than 
Prosser, despite the nonpartisan nature of the election.  Since she lost, we cannot test that 
hypothesis for her case, but this subject deserves greater study.  Do different 
reappointment methods for state supreme courts16 structure the role of partisanship in 
judicial behavior differently?  I develop and justify a conceptualization of judicial 
independence based on the salience of partisanship in shaping the decision of whether or 
not to join the majority opinion.   
 Justices chosen in partisan elections are responsible to a political party, in 
addition to the general electorate and, of course, the law.  If these justices see themselves 
as agents serving a political party as a principal, they should feel a stronger motivation to 
structure their decisions along partisan lines.  Justices in nonpartisan elections do not 
enjoy much better levels of job security and do not enjoy the free information that a 
partisan label provides to voters.  By structuring their dissents on partisan or ideological 
grounds, these justices could send a signal to voters through the news media to 
communicate this same information. 
 The results of my model suggest that the relationship between the decision to 
dissent and the ideological distance between the majority opinion writer and the justice in 
question is strongly contingent on the institutional environment in which that justice 
operates.  Specifically, ideological differences matter much more in states that have 
higher risk reappointment methods.  The rate of dissent overall is also significantly higher 
16 Not all states call their court of last resort a supreme court and or use the title justice for the members of 
these courts.  However, in this dissertation, the term state supreme court refers to all state high courts and 
justices to refer to their members. 
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on courts where seats are less secure.  My model of dissensus will also test a 
comprehensive set of ideological, strategic, and institutional variables.  The results 
suggest that justices on state supreme courts reflect their partisanship through their 
dissents only when they need to send signals to key reappointment actors.  This chapter 
will attempt to address some problems in the literature on dissensus on state supreme 
courts.     
Reappointment Uncertainty and Party Polarization 
 
In a series of seminal studies, Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall (Brace and Hall 
1990, 1993, 1997; Hall 1992, 1995) studied how differing institutional pressures affected 
state supreme court behavior.  They found that electoral accountability led judges to 
conform their behavior to the expectations of their appointing principals.  Justices 
suppressed dissents they otherwise would have joined or written, changed their votes 
when it was clear that their position would not prevail, and were especially likely to alter 
their behavior in the run up to an election.  While significant, these studies suffered from 
several drawbacks.  The analyses were conducted in only a small number of states, 
primarily in states with high reappointment uncertainty.  In addition, pooled probit as a 
method for these data may be inappropriate because it cannot represent the multi-level 
nature of the data.  Finally, these studies focus only on death penalty cases, which could 
lead to problems generalizing to less salient legal issues or states that do not have the 
death penalty. 
 Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2010, 296) demonstrated creativity in their measure of 




duty to enforce the law impartially, without regard to the legally irrelevant characteristics 
of the litigants or the goals of political parties.”  They measure the extent to which a 
judge tends to write opinions in opposition to another judge from the same political party.  
They then test whether judges in different selection methods vary significantly along this 
dimension and found no significant difference in behavior across different selection 
methods.   
 This is a potentially useful measure of judicial independence, but it suffers from 
several theoretical and methodological flaws.  The key independent variable might be 
reappointment methods, not selection methods because the literature indicates judges are 
forward-looking (Savchak and Barghothi 2007).  The logic to this approach dictates that 
once on the bench, justices will be concerned about how to keep their jobs, not how they 
got there.  Second, according to the authors’ classification system, when a judge like 
Antonin Scalia dissents from a majority opinion written by David Souter, this is an 
example of judicial independence because the two justices are appointees of the same 
political party.  Their classification system does not allow enough room for ideological 
variation within one political party, a problem the authors themselves acknowledge.  
Finally, the authors employ a problematic definition of an opposing opinion: writing a 
dissenting opinion when a majority opinion exists, but also writing a majority opinion 




oppose a majority opinion, no judge chooses to write a majority opinion in order to 
oppose a dissent.17   
 If properly constructed, measuring the influence of ideology – as mediated by 
reappointment structures – could provide a useful lens to understand judicial 
independence on state supreme courts.  Behaving in a partisan fashion is a powerful 
signal to elites and to the general public that provides information about a judge that 
could be very important in a reappointment decision.  If, however, there is a low risk of 
losing one’s job, a justice may feel significantly less pressure to reflect their partisanship 
in their judicial decisionmaking.  Instead, judges can feel free to follow other 
considerations internal to the adjudication process. 
Party Polarization Hypothesis: The degree to which partisan differences 
structure judicial decisionmaking on a state supreme court depends on the 
degree of reappointment uncertainty those justices face. 
 
 Brent Boyea (2007) posited a directly contradictory hypothesis between judicial 
selection methods and judicial polarization.  He analyses the ideological range of justices 
across different states and concludes that voters restrict the range of ideological 
acceptability of candidates, while elites can appoint more ideologically polarized judges.  
There are several problems with his approach.  First, not all forms of election or 
appointment have the same principals and the same incentives.  Second, when he 
proceeds to consider levels of consensus on state supreme courts, the author examines 
17 While some opinions are initially written as dissents and later, by virtue of fluxuations in the voting 
blocs, become majority opinions, this assumption is too strong to a useful modeling strategy. 
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death penalty cases, an unrepresentative legal issue because it is not universal across the 
states, either in statute or in application.  
 Another potential criticism of conceptualizing judicial independence through the 
lens of judicial polarization would note that judicial independence is supposed to measure 
the influence of inappropriate outside influences.  They would argue that decisionmaking 
based on partisanship or judicial ideology is neither inappropriate nor an outside 
influence.  My continuous measurement of judicial independence addresses the first 
concern.  It would be unreasonable to label any influence of judicial ideology as 
inappropriate, but one can compare the relative levels of partisanship across different 
reappointment methods.  Endogeneity poses a larger potential problem to my 
conceptualization.   
 Because different actors select justices across the states, these actors may have 
different goals in mind when making their selection.  Judicial nominating commissions 
may seek candidates who possess objective merit, while political parties that nominate 
judges may be looking for faithful agents of a party platform.  If these justices in partisan 
election states end up voting along partisan lines, they are simply behaving according to 
the predictions of the agents who put them there.  This kind of behavior is due to 
selection effects, not a lack of judicial independence.  Judicial independence, in part, 
relies on a notion of sincerity.  Judges who change their mind about a case as a result of a 
bribe are behaving insincerely and non-independently.  However, judges who view law 




 To counter this potential problem, I will pay special attention to three states: 
Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania.  Justices in these states win their initial 
appointment in a partisan election, but at the end of each term thereafter, they are subject 
to a retention election.  If partisanship is endogenous to judicial decisionmaking, we 
should expect justices in these systems to behave in ways similar to states that always use 
partisan judicial elections.  If, however, partisanship is exogenous, one should expect 
these justices to behave like justices in states that always use retention elections.  In other 
words, if selection effects dominate, the influence of partisanship should not fade over 
time despite the fact that justices in these three states no longer are directly responsible to 
a political party. 
A General Theory of Dissensus on State Supreme Courts 
 
 Collegiality is a distinctive feature of all appellate courts, taking the form of both 
consensual and nonconsensual behavior among members.  While the very early history of 
the U.S. Supreme Court featured a struggle to achieve consensus among the justices, the 
feature of the Supreme Court most drastically altered by the constitutional revisions 
occurring after 1937 (and the one most in need of explanation) was this institutional norm 
of consensus.  More recently, scholars have begun to pay renewed attention to the 
institutional context of the U.S. Supreme Court – its group dynamics, but also the rules, 
norms, practices, and other interactions among the justices that structure those group 
dynamics.  Their work reflects a broad concern for mapping the justices’ strategic 
decisions to write their preferences into the law so far as possible within the context of 




strategic approach to the study of collegiality, stating “the strategic model portrays 
justices as responding to the positions articulated by other justices.”  Justices behave 
strategically to achieve the goal of exerting influence through opinion writing on the 
present Court, as well as future ones.   
Institutional Hypotheses 
 
 In addition to providing a window into understanding judicial independence, 
reappointment methods of state supreme courts are important institutions that could 
structure the overall level of dissensus.  One would expect that states with partisan 
judicial elections would feature the highest level of dissensus, as partisanship is more 
salient in the selection of these justices compared to the other systems.  The competitive 
nature, and high uncertainty, of nonpartisan elections would likely increase the 
willingness to dissent, but for other reasons.  Dissents are powerful signals to the media 
(Blake and Hacker 2010), which nonpartisan justices can utilize to reassure the public of 
their ideological bona fides.  The lack of partisan identification on the general election 
ballot leaves voters without the most basic tool for assessing the ideological compatibility 
of judicial candidates. 
 The principle of collegiality manifests itself in judicial behavior in several 
important ways.  First, perceptions of institutional roles could influence the decision to 
dissent.  Several studies have presented evidence that chief justices dissent less frequently 
than associate justices (Blake and Hacker 2010; Collins 2008; Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and 
Maltzman 1999), given their special institutional role as primus inter pares.  Likewise, 




that new justices undergo a period of adjusting to life on the Court, which may influence 
them to avoid conflict with their fellow justices.  This chapter will test whether these 
findings apply on state supreme courts.  As justices become more adjusted to working 
with each other, justices will become more accustomed to following norms of consensus 
and gain more experience with finding optimal strategies in bargaining and 
accommodation to achieve that end.   
The institutional environment of any court also structures workload pressures in a 
variety of ways.  Spriggs, Maltzman, and Wahlbeck (1999) examine the effect of 
workload on the number of revisions a majority opinion writer is willing to circulate.  
While finding that majority opinion writers behave strategically to accommodate other 
justices in the majority coalition, increased workload diminishes the number of opinion 
drafts a majority opinion writer will circulate.  Likewise, Sheldon (1999) found that as 
the number of cases on the docket of the Washington State Supreme Court declined, 
justices authored more dissenting opinions.  With fewer majority opinion assignments 
resulting from a smaller caseload, justices have more time to research and prepare 
dissenting opinions.  Conversely, a large caseload, which often results from mandatory 
right of appeal, would place significant time constraints on each justice, preventing them 
from fixating on their dissenting opinions.  A smaller docket also may contain a higher 
percentage of highly salient cases and more disagreement, which would be consistent 
with the findings of Blake and Hacker (2010).   
Prior research (O’Brien 1999) suggests the amount of time that a justice can 




disposal.  Research on the federal courts of appeal (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 
2007) has revealed that cases heard en banc produce more dissents than cases heard on 
panels.  The size of state supreme courts varies from five to nine justices, and smaller 
courts conduct a very high percentage of their work in panels.  Even so, roughly half the 




When deciding whether to dissent, it is likely that some legal issues provide a 
greater motivation than others, depending on the salience of the issue.  The salient case 
may evoke a response from a justice motivated by preferences for particular policy 
outcomes.  However, scholars have also viewed salience as a strategic factor that 
influences willingness to bargain (Spriggs, Maltzman, and Wahlbeck 1999).  The 
theoretical justification for exploring the influence of salience on justices’ behavior 
relates to the justice’s level of concern about a policy outcome.  A salient case triggers 
the desire to influence a majority opinion (Knight and Epstein 1997) or to establish a 
jurisprudential alternative that a future Court might adopt (Blake and Hacker 2010).   
 Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman (1999) found that Supreme Court justices are 
more likely to write separately in cases of high political and legal salience.  Collins 
(2008) came to a similar conclusion using public and justice-specific measures of 
salience.  Similar to these authors, I predict higher levels of dissent in cases where amicus 
curiae briefs have been filed and cases involving constitutional review.  In addition cases 




increases the likelihood of dissensus (Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward 2013).  In addition 
the government’s involvement in a tort case has been an indication of salience in other 
studies of state supreme court behavior (Cann 2007). 
Strategic Hypotheses 
 
 Langer’s model of judicial review on state supreme courts (Langer 2002, 2003) 
includes a novel conceptualization of policy preference divergence between judges.  In 
addition to measuring the ideological distance between the justice in question and the 
majority opinion writer, Langer also includes the ideological distance between the justice 
in question and the chief justice.  Not every state provides the chief justice with the 
privilege of assigning opinions (Hall 1989), but in the states that do, associate justices 
have an incentive not to antagonize the chief justice so that in future cases, they will 
continue to get better opinion assignments.  I hypothesize that in states with these opinion 
assignment rules, associate justices will be likely to suppress dissents when the chief 
justice is the majority opinion writer. 
Measuring Judicial Independence and the Causes of Dissensus 
Data and Variables 
 
Most of the data for this analysis will come from tort cases in the State Supreme 
Court Data Project (SSCDP) (Brace and Hall 2001).  The analyses will exclude cases 
with per curiam opinions and all data points representing the majority opinion writer in a 
given case.  The unit of analysis is the justice-vote, but it excludes the votes of ad hoc 




supreme courts.  The dependent variable is whether the justice in question dissents,18 
which means the model excludes instances in which the justice in question is the majority 
opinion author.  A justice who writes or joins a dissenting opinion is coded as a 1; all 
other voting activity is coded as 0.19  The independent variable of interest is the 
ideological distance between the justice in question and the majority opinion writer.  The 
standard measure of judicial ideology for state supreme court justices is Party Adjusted 
Judge Ideology (PAJID), as outlined by Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000), using, in part, 
the elite ideology scores of Berry et al. (1998).  Other studies of dissent on the U.S. 
Supreme Court (e.g., Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000) and federal courts of 
appeal (e.g., Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2007) employ ideological distance 
between the majority opinion writer and the justice in question as a rubric for measuring 
the incentive to dissent.   
The control variables come either from within the SSCDP or the State Politics and 
Judiciary Dataset (Lindquist 2010).  More detailed descriptions of all the variables are 
provided in Table 3.1, although one note is in order.  The standard measure for state 
supreme court workload is the presence of an intermediate appellate court (Brace and 
Hall 1990, 1997; Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2010).  The underlying assumption is that 
18 One could conceive of an ordinal arrangement of judicial consensus, with 0 corresponding to joining the 
majority opinion, 1 corresponding to writing or joining a concurring opinion, 2 corresponding to writing or 
joining an opinion that concurs in part and dissents in part, and 3 corresponding to writing or joining a 
dissenting opinion.  I ran a ordered logit model with robust standard errors clustered for each justice.  This 
model yielded similar findings on the key variables as the multi-level model I employ.   
19 Judicial politics scholars often measure dissensus as writing separately versus joining the majority 
opinion (e.g., Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1999).  The problem with this approach is that it treats 
regular and special concurrences equivalently.  Often times, regular concurrences do not express any 
degree of disagreement with the logic of the majority opinion, making this a flawed measure of dissensus.  
Unlike the Spaeth dataset of the U.S. Supreme Court, the SSCDP does not differentiate between regular 
and special concurring opinions.   
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these courts fulfill the need for a mandatory right of appeal, leaving the state high court 
free to choose its own docket with discretion.  While this assumption is true of the design 
of the federal judicial system, it is not true at the state court level.  Seventeen states which 
utilize intermediate appellate courts still maintain mandatory jurisdiction.  Thus, this 
analysis uses the jurisdictional data from the State Politics and Judiciary Dataset to 
operationalize workload pressures. 
Methodology 
 
 The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable lends itself to a probit (or logit) 
regression analysis, but the assumption of independence of errors does not hold because 
this is essentially a panel dataset.  If the role of ideology is hypothesized to be dependent 
on institutional context, this suggests a model using an interaction term.  Traditional 
interactions with categorical variables are reliant on a baseline category upon which the 
other coefficients are built.  Drawing inferences from this approach becomes difficult 
when the sample is non-random in nature.  Gelman and Hill (2007) suggest a multi-level 
approach to model interactions between independent variables of interests and categorical 
variables identifying important groups within a sample.  The data will be analyzed using 
a multi-level logistic model, generating a random slope for the ideological distance 
variable within each reappointment method.20     
Analyzing the Role of the Political Environment on State Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking 
 
20 However, like traditional interactions, it is important to interpret results from visualizations of the mode, 
not simply from a regression table (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). 
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 The results of the multilevel analysis, presented in Table 3.2, demonstrate the 
degree to which institutional design shapes state supreme court behavior.  The fixed 
effects21 for the Ideological Distance variable, while positive in sign, are not statistically 
significant, which indicates that any effect that the ideological distance might have over 
the decision to dissent depends upon the particular reappointment method in which a 
justice is operating.  The random effects of ideological distance are presented visually by 
reappointment method in Figure 3.1.  The predicted probabilities and confidence intervals 
are plotted over the actual range of ideological distances for each reappointment method. 
 Ideology structures the decision to dissent when reappointment uncertainty is 
high.  In states with partisan and nonpartisan elections, differences in party affiliation and 
ideology between the justice in question and the majority opinion writer tend to increase 
the likelihood of writing or joining a dissent.22  However, when states employ 
constitutional designs that limit reappointment uncertainty promote less partisan judicial 
behavior, this influence of partisanship disappears.  The slopes for elite reconfirmation 
and life tenure states are flat, and the slope in retention election states is slightly negative.   
 Figure 3.1 also sheds light on the differing levels of dissensus overall between the 
reappointment methods.  Justices in nonpartisan elections states dissent at the highest 
rate, while justices in states with life tenure are the least likely to disagree.  The former 
finding is puzzling in light of the development of this institution as a means to free state 
supreme courts from the influence of strong party organizations (Tarr 2012).  Despite its 
21 The term “main effects” is often used instead of “fixed effects” (Gelman and Hill 2007). 
22 While the slopes for partisan and nonpartisan election states do not appear to be very pronounced, the 
confidence intervals do not overalap. 
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origins, nonpartisan elections present considerable risk to judicial incumbents today, so 
this finding is consistent with the reappointment uncertainty theory.   
 The higher level of partisan disagreement (and overall dissensus) among justices 
in nonpartisan states may be a way to signal the media, party organizations, and the 
public at large as to what the justice’s true legal preferences really are.  Bonneau and Hall 
(2009) present a great deal of evidence that demonstrates that the partisan label on the 
ballot provides voters valuable information for their vote choice.  Justices in nonpartisan 
election states must face electoral opponents (unlike justices in retention election states) 
but without this key heuristic, though Bonneau and Cann (2012) have found that voters 
can infer ideology in nonpartisan elections from campaign advertisements. 
 States with lower-levels of reappointment uncertainty exhibit much higher 
degrees of consensual behavior, and what disagreement there may be is not structured by 
differences in ideology or partisanship.  This finding runs directly contrary to the 
predominant theory in judicial politics at the U.S. Supreme Court – the attitudinal model 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002).   While a full analysis of the behavioral differences between 
life-tenured state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
several possible hypotheses comes to mind.  First, as Madison discussed in Federalist 10 
(Madison 2010), one of the primary advantages offered by an expansive republic is cross-
cutting cleavages.  Thus, the U.S. Senate is probably more polarized and heterogeneous 
than most principals who select or reappoint state judges.  Many state political cultures 
are much more homogenous and historically stable than the nation as a whole (Elazar 




Second, there is a difference in salience among state-level principals versus 
federal-level principals.  Presidents spent huge amounts of resources to research potential 
Supreme Court nominees (Nemacheck 2008), probably more resources than any governor 
who has appointing authority.  In the most common system of state judicial 
appointments, merit selection, ideological orthodoxy is not considered.  Given the low 
amounts of media coverage and voter knowledge of judicial candidates, the people are 
certainly less invested in choosing “the right kind of judge” compared to federal-level 
principals.  Finally, while state supreme courts do decide high salience cases, such as gay 
marriage (e.g., Baehr v. Miike 1993, Baker v. Vermont 1999, Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health 2003, In re Marriage Cases 2008, Varnum v. Brien 2009) and school 
finance (e.g., Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby 1989, Rose v. Council for 
Better Education 1989), on many cases, the highest court in a state is not the highest 
court in the land.  Cases that raise federal questions can be appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which may give state supreme court justices institutional incentives to behave 
more consensually. 
 The remaining institutional variables performed as expected.  Workload pressures 
resulting from a mandatory right of appeal to a state supreme court lead to fewer dissents.  
Justices with more resources (law clerks) are significantly more likely to issue dissenting 
opinions, which is consistent with findings of O’Brien (1999).  Courts with larger 
memberships produce more dissents than smaller ones, and justices working on a panel 
are more consensual than justices sitting en banc.  This latter finding is similar to the 




justices are less likely than associate justices to issue dissenting opinions, which provides 
further evidence of their unique judicial role (Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1999).  
Freshmen are less likely to dissent, though this finding falls short of conventional levels 
of statistical significance. 
The one potentially puzzling institutional finding is that courts with more 
experienced justices are more dissensual than courts with lower tenure levels.  The 
prediction is that, over time, justices become more expert at bargaining and 
accommodation with their colleagues, which lowers the need for dissenting opinions.  
This finding in the opposite direction as expected is also puzzling in light of the fact that 
justices in life tenure states exhibit more consensus than justices in any other 
reappointment method.  Further investigation into ideological polarization among 
different election cohorts over time may be warranted. 
The legal and strategic variables performed less well.  The presence of amicus 
curiae briefs leads to more dissents than cases that are less legally salient.  The 
coefficient of the legal complexity variable was negative, as predicted, but it did not 
come close to achieving statistical significance.  The coefficient for constitutional review 
cases is in the opposite direction as predicted, although this finding is not statistically 
significant.  There is also no statistically significant relationship between the likelihood 
of dissent in cases where the chief justice is the majority opinion writer. 
 The deeper theoretical question, however, remains: does evidence of partisan 
behavior suggest evidence of non-independence?  If one assumes that all judges should 




Legal realists (Cardozo 1922; Frank 1973) and supporters of the attitudinal model (Segal 
and Spaeth 2002) would dispute the accuracy of this assumption.  Judicial independence 
is threatened when illegitimate outside signals influence judicial decisions.  If, however, 
partisanship (or judicial ideology) is endogenous to judicial preferences, its influence 
cannot be evidence of non-independence.  It is clear from the results that partisanship is 
not endogenous to all types of state supreme courts, but one could make the case that the 
partisan nature of judicial recruitment might produce very different justices in these high-
risk states than others.   
 On the other hand, the results in Table 3.3 suggest that neither partisanship nor 
judicial ideology are endogenous to judicial decisionmaking.  The only difference 
between Table 3.2 and 3.3 is that the latter includes an additional random slope for an 
additional reappointment method – hybrid states.  Recall from earlier that Illinois, New 
Mexico, and Pennsylvania appoint new justices to their state supreme court via a partisan 
election, but when these justices go up for reapproval, they do so in a non-competitive 
retention election.  If partisanship or ideology were endogenous, the justices in these 
three hybrid states should behave in ways similar to justices in partisan election states.  
On the contrary, Figure 3.2 reveals that justices in hybrid states behave more closely to 
justices in retention election states – that is, ideological distance and partisan differences 
do not significantly increase the likelihood of dissenting.   
 There is a second endogeneity problem that this conceptualization of judicial 
independence may encounter.  Thus far, I have assumed judges only follow the path of 




when the risk of losing their job is higher.  However, this approach may only explain the 
behavior of judges from the majority party in a state.  Revealing one’s true liberal 
credentials in Texas, for example, is not strategic, and thus liberal justices in that state 
may behave in a less partisan but less independent fashion (Hall 1992).  On the other 
hand, Helmke and Staton (2011) argued that life tenure may undermine judicial 
independence because the high utility associated with holding such an appointment.  
With high utility comes more caution in using the power associated with judgeship.  If 
judges with short, fixed terms value the job less, they will be less afraid to challenge 
authority because a temporary job has less utility. 
 Table 3.4 presents a test of these rival hypotheses in a multilevel logit model.  The 
regression only includes states with partisan or nonpartisan elections, and it is further 
limited to justices in those states whose ideology is out of sync with the people of their 
state.  In order to make that determination, I classified justices with a higher than 
midpoint PAJID score (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000) as liberal and states with a higher 
than average?? value on the Erikson, Wright, and McIver state ideology score (1993) as 
liberal.  The regression interacts the ideological distance between the outlier justice and 
majority opinion writer and the absolute value of the state ideology score, which 
represents the degree of ideological polarization in the state.  The results in Table 3.4 
suggest that the Helmke and Staton approach may be a bit more persuasive.  When a 
justice is a large outlier in her state and there is a large distance between herself and the 
majority opinion writer, the justice is more likely to dissent, although these results are not 




3.4 are essentially the same as those that only include tort cases or cases in which the 
majority is overturning a criminal’s sentence. 
Implications for State Constitutional Design 
 
Throughout American history, designers of state constitutions have attempted to 
find an optimal combination of judicial independence and accountability through 
different reappointment methods.  These data indicate that these constitutional structures 
have real behavioral consequences.  Partisanship is only a salient feature of judicial 
decisionmaking when the strategic and institutional context dictates that it be so.  When 
reappointment uncertainty is lower, state supreme court justices base their decisions on 
other strategic and legal considerations.  In this regard, these results are consistent with 
other studies of dissent on state supreme courts (Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall 
1992, 1995), but they also provide a much more comprehensive picture of state supreme 
court behavior. 
 At the same time, these results differ significantly from Brace and Hall’s past 
work on state supreme courts.  Justices in high-risk reappointment methods (partisan and 
nonpartisan elections) who are ideological outliers in comparison to their state do not 
suppress dissenting votes when the majority opinion is being written by a majority party 
justice.  As a result, one can more confidently conclude that where cross-party agreement 
exists, it is a result of rule-of-law considerations, rather than a sort of “false consensus” 
motivated by strategic, electoral considerations.  In a related vein, the partisan difference 
(or ideological distance) approach employed here assumes that partisanship offers a judge 




Dissents can be motivated by both partisanship and what the law actually requires if the 
two overlap.  Unfortunately, measuring this accurately would be extremely difficult. 
 Now we can better understand the high stakes of the campaign between Justice 
David Prosser and JoAnne Kloppenburg.  Liberals in Wisconsin did not have a firm 
guarantee that JoAnne Kloppenburg would oppose Governor Walker’s anti-union 
legislation if she were elected because she was not directly responsible to the Democratic 
Party.  However, under its current system of nonpartisan elections, the results of this 






Chapter Four: State Supreme Court Justices “Following the Election Returns” 
 
No matter whether the country follows the flag or not, the Supreme Court follows the 
election returns. – Mr. Dooley 
 
        Finley Peter Dunne (1963) 
 
 
 While legal theorists have spent decades wrestling with the countermajoritarian 
difficulty (Bickel 1962), state supreme courts may face the opposite problem – a 
majoritarian difficulty that could undermine the rule of law.  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor has taken an even stronger stand against judicial elections.  O’Connor has 
written op-eds and lent her name to campaigns to reform state courts to increase judicial 
independence.  Interestingly, O’Connor is one of only two23 Supreme Court justices born 
in the 20th century who had experience as a state judge.  President Reagan elevated her to 
the U.S. Supreme Court while she was serving an interim appointment on the Arizona 
Court of Appeals.  Prior to that post, Justice O’Connor had run for a Superior Court 
judgeship in Maricopa County, needing to win a partisan primary along the way.   
According to O’Connor biographer Joan Biskupic, O’Connor prevailed despite 
being outspent by her opponent, who had been appointed by the governor to temporarily 
fill the newly-created seat.  Much like modern campaigns for judge, Justice O’Connor’s 
campaign literature stressed being tough on crime: “As a lawyer and as a legislator I am 
deeply concerned about the need to strengthen the enforcement of the laws that govern 
our conduct.  As a citizen, a wife and a mother, I want to help replace fear in our streets 
with strength in our courtrooms” (Biskupic 2006, 65). 
23 The other is Justice William Brennan, who served on the Supreme Court of New Jersey after having 
served two years on a Superior Court in that state. 
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 This chapter explores the influence of different reappointment methods on levels 
of responsiveness to changes in the political environment.  Do judges issue more liberal 
opinions as their state governing coalition becomes more liberal?  Does that level of 
responsiveness vary across reappointment methods by levels of uncertainty? 
 
Reappointment Uncertainty and the Political Environment 
 
Scholars have found some evidence that state supreme court justices respond to 
electoral pressures.  Hall (1995) and Brace and Hall (1997) find that in states with strong 
public support for the death penalty, justices are more likely to uphold death sentences, 
especially when an election is looming.  One major drawback of these studies is that they 
do not have precise figures for public ideology at the state level.  More recent research 
has attempted to solve this problem.  Brace and Boyea (2008) found that elected justices 
are more sensitive to public opinion on the death penalty than appointed justices, but they 
assume all methods of judicial elections are created equal as well as all methods of elite 
appointment are created equal.  Life tenured judges, for example, might behave 
differently than justices who must seek gubernatorial/legislative reapproval.   
 Similarly, the behavioral incentives for justices might differ depending on 
whether their reappointment comes with a partisan label or whether the justice faces an 
opponent or not.  Canes-Wrone, Clark and Park (2012) take this into account in their 
study of state supreme courts and abortion cases.  The authors found that justices in 
retention elections and nonpartisan elections states are sensitive to public opinion, while 




counterintuitive finding that the authors did not satisfactorily explain, either theoretically 
or post hoc.  This finding counters their theory that greater levels of information constrain 
judicial behavior, as well as the findings of (Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark 2009).  
Why would party agents in charge of renomination of judges permit such behavior?  The 
study also does not examine judicial behavior in states that do not have judicial elections.  
If justices in these states are also responsive to public opinion, it changes the conclusions 
one can make concerning relative levels of decisional independence.   
 Shepherd (2009) utilized a creative measure of judicial independence for state 
supreme court behavior.  The author looked at state supreme court votes after an election 
in which the governorship of the state in question flipped from one party to the other 
between 1996 and 1997 and found that judicial behavior changes toward the preferences 
of the new party in power.  Before jumping to conclusions that this demonstrates a lack 
of judicial independence, Shepherd only tested three states (which all featured partisan 
judicial elections).  Even more problematically, it is not at all clear what methods the 
author used to compare pre-election behavior to post-election behavior.  If tested more 
rigorously, this measure could be a useful indication of decisional independence. 
Governing Coalition Capture Hypothesis 
 
 The rule of law presumes that earlier cases decided by courts restrain the choices 
available to future courts.  If a court changes its outlook on the law overnight because of 
a critical election, it would undermine decisional independence by ignoring the rule of 
law.  If a change in the political environment does not result in a change in the 




a change in the political environment leads to an ideological change on a state supreme 
court in the opposite direction, that would be an example of countermajoritarian behavior 
(Bickel 1962). 
 When the political environment in a state changes, state high court justices have 
an incentive to be sensitive to these cues, regardless of whether they are directly 
responsible to the public or elite actors.  The governing coalition is directly responsible 
for reappointing unelected judges, but it plays an important role in states with judicial 
elections as well.  Political elites have more resources to monitor judicial behavior than 
the average citizen, and if they find that behavior objectionable, they can inform the 
public about it through the media (Zaller 1992).   
Governing Coalition Capture Hypothesis: State supreme court justices 
change the ideological direction of their judicial decisions to follow 
changes in the ideological direction of the political environment in their 
state only to the degree to which they face reappointment uncertainty. 
  
Data and Methods 
 
 Most of the data for this chapter’s analysis will come from the State Supreme 
Court Data Project (SSCDP) (Brace and Hall 2001), although the analysis excludes six 
states24 that elect their state supreme court justices in judicial districts because it is very 
difficult to gather data at the sub-state level.  I will test the reappointment uncertainty 
hypothesis the same set of torts cases used in Chapter 3.  The unit of analysis is the 
justice-vote.  The model also excludes the votes of ad hoc justices – retired judges, or 
judges of lower courts who temporarily fill in on state supreme courts.  The dependent 
24 These states are Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and Nebraska. 
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variable is whether the justice in question casts a liberal vote, which is one in favor of the 
original plaintiff.25  
 The key independent variable is the change in the governing coalition, calculated 
using the annual difference in Berry elite ideology scores (Berry et al. 1998).  The 
original Berry scores relied on unadjusted interest-group ratings from a state’s members 
of Congress to infer information about the ideological position of each state legislature 
and governor.  More recently, Berry et al. (2010) suggested that substituting 
NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1985) provided a marginal improvement in 
convergent validity over their previous estimation method.  However, for the mid-1990s, 
the timeframe for the analysis in this dissertation, the NOMINATE approach dramatically 
reduces the amount of variation in state ideology from year to year.  As the authors 
acknowledge, NOMINATE scores are fixed, whereas the interest-group scores can vary 
for the same members of Congress.  Thus, in 47 of the 50 states there is at least one year 
in which the NOMINATE-based scores are identical to the year before.   
 Shor and McCarty (2011) offer a more direct approach to measuring state 
legislative ideology by analyzing state roll call records.  Unfortunately, the amount of 
missing data in the Shor and McCarty dataset renders it unhelpful for this project.  Berry 
et al. (2013) find that their measure performs basically as well as those of Shor and 
McCarty.  Thus, faced with several imperfect choices, this dissertation will employ the 
original Berry elite ideology scores (1998).  As Berry et al. (2010, 125) conclude, 
25 I use an justice-vote unit of analysis rather than a justice-level approach because it allows for the 
inclusion of case-level controls and additional points of analysis.  The percentage of liberal versus 




                                               
  
“[U]sers of the extant measure probably have not been led astray in their substantive 
conclusions.” 
 The annual difference includes a one-year lag.  When a justice is deciding a case 
in 1995, she will be reacting to the change in the political environment that occurred 
between 1993 and 1994.  The goal of this variable is not to measure public opinion in all 
50 states on a given issue.  Rather, the goal is to approximate how state supreme court 
justices make their own approximations.  Many states do not have newspapers or 
universities that do state-level polling regularly, but all justices will have a rough sense as 
to the mean ideology of the citizens of their state.   
 For almost every justice, the SSCDP includes PAJID scores, which is the standard 
measure of the state supreme court ideology (Brace, Hall, and Langer 2001), which range 
from conservative to liberal.  The model also includes case-level controls: state 
involvement and constitutional cases.  Prior studies (Bonneau and Cann 2009; Cann 
2007) have demonstrated that state involvement in tort cases produces more liberal votes.  
Some state torts cases26 have state and federal equal protection or due process 
implications (Wriggins 2010), and these cases may be more likely to be resolved in favor 
of the original plaintiff than other cases.  Table 4.1 contains a description of all the 
variables.   
 As in Chapter Three, the dependent variable is dichotomous, which lends itself to 
a logit or probit model, and a multi-level logistic regression model can best measure the 
26 By this, I do not mean cases arising under alleged violations 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows citizens to 
sue the federal government for violations of federal constitutional rights. 
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effect of the key independent variable across different group variables.  Like the previous 
chapter, a random slope is used for each reappointment method. 
Analyzing the Nexus between Reappointment Uncertainty and Polarization 
 
 A positive slope indicates non-independent behavior because it demonstrates 
significant influence of changes in the governing coalition on judicial decisions.  A 
coefficient that is not significantly different from zero indicates that outside influences do 
not affect a justice’s vote.  This would meet the proposed definition of decisional judicial 
independence.  A negative coefficient indicates countermajoritarian behavior (Bickel 
1962).  This type of finding means that as the state environment becomes more liberal, 
the justices become more conservative.  Recall from Chapter 1 that partisan elections 
have the highest level of reappointment uncertainty, followed by nonpartisan elections, 
retention elections, elite reconfirmation, and life tenure at the lowest.  Thus for each set 
of interaction terms, one would expect to find larger effects in states with partisan 
elections followed by smaller effects in states with nonpartisan elections, retention 
elections, and life tenure if the reappointment uncertainty hypothesis is correct. 
 The results, presented in Table 4.2, indicate general support for my hypothesis.  
Model 2 is identical to Model 1 except that it includes an additional random slope for the 
three hybrid states – Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania –  which use partisan 
elections for open seats but retention elections for incumbent justices.  The fixed effects 
and random effects in both models are basically the same.  There are statistically 




that as a state becomes more liberal the likelihood of a liberal vote increases across the 
board, but that there are significant variations across the reappointment methods. 
 Those random effects are presented visually in Figures 4.1, which corresponds 
with Model 1, and 4.2, which includes the hybrid states in Model 2.  Like in Chapter 3, 
the reappointment method that demonstrates the lowest level of decisional independence 
is nonpartisan elections, as that group has the strongest positive slope.  Justices in 
partisan elections states have the highest level of reappointment uncertainty, and the 
slope for that group is not quite as strongly positive as the one for nonpartisan elections.  
These findings supplement those of Shepherd (2009), who only measured the effects of 
environmental changes in three states with partisan elections. 
 The main differences in the results between Figures 4.1 and 4.2 occurs in 
retention elections and elite reappointment states.  When hybrid states are added in Figure 
4.2 the remaining retention election states appear more responsive to changes in the 
political environment, a finding that runs contrary to the reappointment uncertainty 
theory.  It is justices in the three hybrid states who are initially chosen by partisan actors 
rather than nonpartisan judicial commissions.  While Figure 4.1 indicates that justices in 
elite reappointment states appear to move in the opposite direction as their states, in 
Figure 4.2 the slope for these justices flattens out, which indicates judicial independence.   
 In both figures, justices who have life tenure became more liberal as their states 
became more conservative, and vice versa.  These results suggests the presence of 
countermajoritarian behavior (Bickel 1962).  When justices with life tenure issue 




ensuing controversy because they do not need to seek reappointment. The only way for 
these justices to be held accountable is through impeachment, and issuing unpopular 
opinions is not considered legitimate grounds to remove judges from office.27  When 
thinking  of an explanation of countermajoritarian behavior, one must keep in mind that 
judicial decisions are product of a form of supply and demand.  Even if a set of justices 
do not change their view of the law, countermajoritarian behavior will occur if litigants 
bring a distinctly new set of cases before a court.  For example, if litigants bring cases 
that challenge legal precedents that had previously have been thought of as settled, the 
justices behavior will appear to have become more liberal.  However, the real change is 
in new baseline supply of radically conservative cases.28 
 The control variables in Models 1 and 2 behave largely as predicted.  Judicial 
ideology is a strong predictor of votes.  The sign of the coefficient for constitutional cases 
is in the predicted direction (positive), but it fails to achieve statistical significance.  
However, state involvement in a tort case is produces significantly fewer liberal votes 
than cases in which the state is not involved.  This finding runs contrary to the 
hypothesis.  
 These data suggest that scholars should reject the framework offered by Brace and 
Boyea (2008), who broke their analysis along the lines of elected versus appointed 
justices.  This typology is not accurate enough because it combines different methods of 
reappointment with very different risks.  My findings also differ from those of Canes-
27 Recent data in the states indicate that state legislatures are abiding by this convention (Bratton, Spill, and 
Sill 2012). 
28 The reverse could happen just as easily: justices could appear to become more conservative as radically 
more liberal cases overtake the docket. 
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Wrone, Clark, and Park (2012), who presented evidence that judges in partisan election 
states behave independently of public opinion and judges in  retention election states 
adhere to public opinion in abortion cases.  These differences could be a result of the 
differences in issue areas and timeframes measured in each study, the lack of data on 
unelected state supreme court justices, or perhaps because these authors utilized random 
intercepts, not random slopes in their methodological approach.   
 
Implications for State Constitutional Design 
 
 This research also sheds light on the nature of representative institutions.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections 
(Chisom v. Roemer 1991), meaning that thinking of elected judges as representatives of 
the people has some merit.  Congressional scholars will be quick to argue that members 
of Congress tend to vote in ways consistent with the views of their constituents (e.g., 
Bartels 1991).  In their classic work, Miller and Stokes (1963) studied the voting behavior 
of House of Representatives members.  They found a strong influence based on the 
policy preferences within their districts, although conditions of influence presupposing 
effective communication between congressmen and their districts are less convergent.  
On the other hand, justices on the U.S. Supreme Court exhibit signs of responsiveness to 
changes in public and elite opinion, even though the public knows very little about the 
Court or its work. 
 In the context of judicial elections, the amount of political information 




much attention from the media (Schaffner and Diascro 2009), although levels of 
campaign spending in judicial elections has increased drastically in recent years 
(Bonneau 2009).  One could infer that despite low levels of information, the mere threat 
of electoral defeat built into certain reappointment methods can produce judicial behavior 
that is consonant with public or elite preferences (Jacobson 1987).  When elites are in 
charge of reappointing justices, we might expect this information imbalance to be 
overcome, yet justices in these states enjoy low levels of reappointment uncertainty.  In 
many instances analyzed here, justices in these states take advantage of this discretion 
and behave independently of public opinion and changes in the political environment. 
 The question remains whether (or how much) judicial responsiveness to changes 
in governing coalition is normatively desirable.  Alexander Bickel (1962) ultimately 
accepts the countermajoritarian difficulty as the surest way to protect minority rights 
from capricious majorities.  However, using the security of institutional judicial 
independence as a means to force a skeptical public to accept a vision of the law that they 
do not accept has not been a particularly effective strategy throughout American history 
(Rosenberg 1993).  In fact, Bickel does not consider the long-run implications of an 
aggressively countermajoritarian court.  If any court continually overplays its hand, it will 
lose the political capital to protect minority rights in the future. 
Non-responsiveness to changes in the governing coalition or public opinion poses 
a threat to democracy by making the judiciary out of touch.  On the other hand, too much 
responsiveness renders the potential for the protection of minority rights almost 




for state policymakers.  As states continue to debate potential changes to their judicial 
selection and reappointment methods in the future, hopefully this dissertation will help 







Chapter Five: Does Money Buy Justice? 
 
[U]nder a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness…the 
probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level. 
 
Justice Anthony Kennedy (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 2009, 2263)  
 
 When Hugh Caperton sued Massey Coal in 1998, a state trial court in West 
Virginia found for Caperton and ordered $50 million in damages.  The Supreme Court of 
Appeals29 reversed the decision and dismissed the case.  Prior to the high court ruling, 
Caperton asked Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself, as he had accepted $3 million 
in campaign contributions from Don Blankenship, the C.E.O. of Massey Coal.  Justice 
Benjamin, a Republican, had narrowly upset a Democratic incumbent in 2004 in what 
was then the second most expensive judicial race in American history.  On appeal, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that elected judges have a due process obligation to recuse 
themselves when large campaign contributions pose a “risk of actual bias” (Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal 2009).  Justice Benjamin defended himself by stating that in prior 
cases, as a lower court judge, he had ruled against Massey Coal (“Judicial Independence: 
Only in America” 2009).   
Campaign finance in judicial elections raises two important, yet contradictory, 
normative concerns.  If Justice Benjamin was inclined to vote against Massey Coal, but 
the $3 million contribution changed his mind, then one could argue that justice is for sale.  
If, however, Justice Benjamin was already sincerely inclined to support Massey Coal in 
the lawsuit in question, it means that Don Blankenship had not received a quid pro quo.  
Instead, the fear might be that powerful interests are able to stack state supreme courts 
29 The Supreme Court of Appeals is the court of last resort in West Virginia. 
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with judges who sincerely share their interests, which may or may not coincide with what 
the law requires in a given case.30  Like other forms of elections, higher levels of 
campaign spending drive electoral success in judicial elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009).   
 Is Caperton an anomaly or an indication of a more prevalent problem in the rule 
of law?  Surprisingly, polling data from those directly involved in this practice admit that 
there may be a systematic problem.  In 2001, the non-profit advocacy group Justice at 
Stake published a survey of over 2,400 state judges (Greenburg and DiVall 2002).  The 
survey found that 35 percent of state supreme court justices believe campaign 
contributions had at least some influence on judicial decisions, and 68 percent also 
expressed support for limiting contribution levels to judicial candidates.  In 2007, another 
Justice at Stake poll of business leaders found that 79 percent of them believed campaign 
contributions affected judicial decisions, yet 93 percent of those surveyed strongly 
supported judicial recusal when a case involves a campaign contributor.  In fact, 71 
percent of business leaders surveyed favored depoliticizing judicial selection by adopting 
a Missouri plan of merit selection followed by retention elections (Zogby and Peck 
2007).  On the other hand, James Gibson’s experimental research (2012) has 
demonstrated that judicial elections also have a legitimation effect on the public that may 
be sufficient to eclipse the public’s disdain for money in judicial elections. 
 Spending on judicial elections has increased dramatically in recent years.  During 
the 1990s, judicial candidates raised $83.3 million, but in the next decade, that amount 
30 Incredibly, the television ads funded by an independent group that Blankenship funded did not laud 
Justice Benjamin’s acumen on corporate law.  Instead, they criticized the Democratic incumbent for being 
soft on crime (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 2009). 
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more than doubled to $206.7 million.  Of that figure, business interests contributed $62.6 
million, with the plaintiff’s bar running a close second with $59.3 million.  Independent 
expenditures on judicial races are also on the rise, comprising 30% of the money spent 
during the 2009-2010 election cycle.  Business interests are much more likely to spend 
money on television advertising than the plaintiff’s bar (Shepherd 2013, 5–6).  
Some state governments have responded with public financing schemes for 
judicial candidates (Goldberg 2002), but these programs are now in doubt after the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United (2010) or they have proven ineffective 
(Corriher 2013).  Since Caperton, fewer than a dozen states have reformed their recusal 
rules (Gibeaut 2012).  One such state is Louisiana, and a study (Palmer 2010) found that 
even when justices on that state’s supreme court recused themselves when large 
contributors appeared before them, a risk of actual bias still occurred when small 
contributors appeared before the court. 
 The goal of this chapter is to develop and test a comprehensive theory of judicial 
independence and test it on the richest amount of data of any study to date, using 
advanced methods that are appropriate to handle the endogenous nature of this question.  
Reappointment Uncertainty and Campaign Cash 
 
 Most of the congressional literature that examines the role of money in politics 
has not found strong evidence of a quid pro quo relationship between contributor and 
legislator (see Stratmann 2005). Recent scholarship on money in state politics (Powell 
2012), on the other hand, reveals a much different picture: the more money legislators 




their policy decisions.  Early scholarly investigations into the role of money in judicial 
elections (Bonneau, Cann, and Boyea 2012; Bonneau and Cann 2009; Cann 2007; 
McCall 2003) have also indicated that some justices are influenced by lawyers who 
contribute and then appear in their courtroom.  These studies focused on only a few 
states, which makes generalizing from the results difficult. 
 Though lawyers account for much of the pool of campaign donations in judicial 
elections, opponents of judicial elections are also concerned with the influence of 
corporations and other interest groups, which these studies do not consider.  Kang and 
Shepherd (2011) and Shepherd (2013) examine the influence of contributions from the 
business community, but they apply their independent variable – the total dollar 
contributions from all sectors – to all business cases.  A better approach to a judge-vote 
unit of analysis would be to match contributions from particular sectors of the business 
community to cases in which they have a direct interest.  The studies also do not consider 
the potential competing influence from liberal groups, such as trial lawyers.   
 Applied to the context of campaign finance for state supreme races, it follows 
from the reappointment uncertainty theory: 
Interest Group Capture Hypothesis: Justices will adjust their voting 
behavior in the ideological direction sought by their contributions only if 
they operate in electoral systems with high reappointment uncertainty. 
 
 This hypothesis presupposes that candidates for judicial elections need to raise 
money.  The reappointment uncertainty theory also applies at another level: justices will 
only raise significant amounts of money if their job security is in jeopardy.  Judicial 




endorsement of their party and winning a general election.  Prior studies have shown that 
partisan races are more likely to recruit challengers and raise more money than 
nonpartisan elections (Bonneau and Hall 2009).  Justices in retention elections typically 
do not raise much, if any, money, but recent retention elections have attracted rapid 
increases in outside spending (“Judicial Elections, Unhinged” 2012). 
Potential Problems with Reappointment Uncertainty 
 
 The incentive structure established by reappointment institutions may differ in 
this analysis compared to the others undertaken in this dissertation.  Candidates in 
partisan judicial elections, though they enjoy the lowest level of job security, also 
automatically enjoy the highest amount of free information conveyed to voters at the 
polls – their party identification.  Party identification is also an important signal to 
potential campaign contributors.  With more information about a candidate’s probable 
future behavior, contributors are more likely to discount the utility of a contribution if the 
contributor’s interests are strongly at odds with the worldview of the candidate. 
 Justices in nonpartisan elections have to overcome the lack of information on the 
ballot and identify their worldview with voters through other means.  Lack of voter 
information is even higher in the timeframe captured in the State Supreme Court 
Database (1995-1998).  The data used in this dissertation predates Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White (2002), when the U.S. Supreme Court allowed state judicial 
candidates to discuss current legal controversies during their campaigns.  Without 
information in the media or on the ballot, voters might be more dependent on campaign 




more important in these races than in partisan elections, even though nonpartisan states 
have lower levels of reappointment uncertainty.  If money is a more important 
consideration for these candidates, they may be more willing to accommodate the 
interests of their contributors when they conflict with the justice’s ideology.  Moreover, 
since there is no oversight from either political party, nonpartisan elections justices may 
feel as though these accommodations are less conspicuous.   
 Partisan elections justices must fend off the threat of a primary challenge, which 
could mean that faced between following the interest of a campaign contributor and 
voting in a way to please their party, assuming they conflict, partisan considerations 
might triumph.  Many partisan elections justices have used their service on state supreme 
courts as a stepping-stone to campaigns for governor, state attorney general, and U.S. 
House and Senate.  Their primary concern, often, is upward mobility, not remaining on 
the bench (Geyh 2003).  Either way, these justices should be expected to be more partisan 
in their decisionmaking.   
Data and Methods 
 
This analysis, like the others in this project, relies on data from the State Supreme 
Court Data Project (SSCDP) (Brace and Hall 2001).  Additional features of state judicial 
systems and other valuable state-level political data comes from the State Politics and the 
Judiciary dataset (Lindquist 2010).  The Judicial Elections Data Initiative (JEDI) (Martin 
2010) provides additional details about the personal attributes of the justices.  Data on 
campaign contributions in judicial elections comes from the National Institute on Money 




Like Chapters 3 and 4, the analysis includes tort cases from six legal areas: 
medical malpractice cases, automobile torts, toxic substances and environmental torts, 
products liability cases, premises liability cases, and insurance cases.  Each of these legal 
issues is of great concern to various segments of the business community, on the one 
hand, and lawyers, on the other.  In order to examine these two interest groups vying 
against each other in the same case, tort cases were selected with businesses as the 
original defendant and non-businesses as the original plaintiff.  For more information 
about what types of plaintiffs were chosen from the SSCDP, see Appendix A.  The 
NCMSP tracks the occupation of each donor to judicial elections, and business 
contributions are paired with relevant cases to test for a possible influence.  
Unfortunately, the NCMSP does not give any detail about what types of attorneys 
(corporate, public interest, etc.) make contributions.  Appendix B contains a description 
of the coding procedure used to select cases and match contributions. 
State supreme court justices included in the analysis share the following 
attributes.  First, they served the full four years (1995-1998) recorded in the State 
Supreme Court Data Project.  Second, they did not face an election between 1995 and 
1998.  Third, they did not face mandatory retirement (due to age) during the term they 
were serving.  In other words, these judges have an incentive to raise campaign 
contributions because they are eligible to run for reelection.  Fourth, the justices serve in 





 The unit of analysis is the judge-vote.  The dependent variable is whether the 
justice in question cast a liberal vote, defined as a vote for the original plaintiff.  The 
independent variables of interest are contributions from the business industry involved in 
the case and lawyers.  Utilizing total dollar contributions would skew the distribution at 
both low- and high-dollar levels of contributions, thus the natural log of business and 
attorney contributions are used instead.  A justice’s liberalism will be measured using 
party-adjusted judge ideology (PAJID) (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000).  Like Chapter 4 
the model includes two additional, dichotomous controls: state involvement and 
constitutional cases.  
Addressing Endogeneity 
 
The largest obstacle to measuring this relationship is the classic “chicken and 
egg” problem that confronts any study of campaign finance.  Do justices vote the way 
they do because they have been influenced by campaign contributions from donors with 
divergent preferences?  Alternatively, do donors contribute to justices because they are 
already inclined to vote in their interests?  The answers to both questions are normatively 
important, but the most useful social science model can tell policymakers precisely which 
of these issues are in play in their state.  The most recent study of campaign contributions 
in judicial elections (Shepherd 2013) utilizes multilevel modeling with  random intercepts 
for each justice and state.  This approach cannot discern the direction of these conflicting 
causal arrows. 
Instrumental variables probit can diagnose and solve this endogeneity problem 




endogenous regressors but not causally related to the dependent variable (Maddala 1983).  
Successful instrumental variables will correlate with the incentive of either business 
leaders or attorneys to donate to any judicial candidate, regardless of the candidate’s 
ideological proclivity in a given tort case.  The model includes four instrumental 
variables: whether or not the justice in question is a freshman, whether or not the justice 
in question was a quality judicial candidate, the number of torts cases on the docket in 
1996, and the strength of a state’s campaign finance regimen (Witko 2005).   
The campaign finance literature has demonstrated that contributors are rational 
(Wright 1996) – that is, they not only want to maximize the chance that the candidates 
they back will in turn back them, but they also want to invest in candidates who are likely 
to win.  A justice who has survived her freshman term has achieved an electoral 
advantage of incumbency, which creates an incentive with donors to “back the winner,” 
regardless of ideological leaning.  Likewise, judicial elections scholars have 
demonstrated that quality candidates, that is candidates who have won a prior election to 
office, tend to perform better than electoral newcomers (Bonneau and Hall 2009).  If 
donors have more of an assurance that donations will not be wasted on a poorly executed 
campaign, they will be more likely to contribute, regardless of the candidate’s ideology. 
Interests groups on both sides of torts cases will likely wish to invest more 
resources when there are more torts cases on a state supreme court’s docket.  When a 
donor’s interests dominate the judicial landscape, they will likely be more active in 
making contributions than when they have less at stake.  Finally, the Witko index 




strength of a state’s campaign finance regimen.  The index is more comprehensive than a 
simple maximum contribution amount for a donor in a given state; it takes into account a 
variety of campaign finance laws on the books in each state in 2002.  The index, a series 
of dummy variables similar in structure to Newmark’s approach (2005) to measuring the 
stringency of lobbying regulation, includes various disclosure and reporting rules, public 
financing provisions, and several campaign contribution and spending limits.   
Analyzing the Influence of Money in State Supreme Court Decisionmaking 
 
Table 5.1 describes the variables in greater detail.  Because each judicial elections 
system has systematically different levels of reappointment uncertainty the same model 
will be repeated for partisan elections and nonpartisan elections.31  Incumbents in only 
two retention elections raised any reelection funds, two Pennsylvanians running for 
reelection after their freshman terms.32  Because so few judge-votes in retention elections 
states have variation in the key independent variables, they are excluded from analysis. 
 The results for partisan elections in Table 5.2 include a traditional probit analysis 
supplemented with an instrumental variables probit.  The Wald exogeneity test examines 
whether the two campaign contribution variables are exogenous to the model.  The 
resulting χ2 value indicates that this null hypothesis can be rejected at the p < 0.01 level, 
31 Though it would have been desirable for controlling for the panel nature of the data, I was not able to 
cluster the standard errors on either instrumental variables model (partisan or nonpartisan), as the resulting 
model would not converge under any of a variety of settings in Stata. 
32 Along with Illinois and New Mexico, Pennsylvania appoints new justices to their state supreme court via 




                                               
  
suggesting that these variables require instrumentation.  The overidentification test33 
indicates that the null hypothesis – the IV-probit model is overidentified – can be 
rejected, although just barely (p = 0.051).  The overidentification test is based on the 
observation that the residuals should be uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables 
if the instruments are truly exogenous.  The control variables performed as expected in 
both probit models of partisan election states.  Judicial ideology is a strong predictor of 
judicial decisions even after instrumental variables are applied.  Justices are more 
inclined to cast liberal votes when the government is party to a case and when a case 
involves a constitutional claim. 
 The results from both methodological approaches are fairly similar, although the 
coefficient for lawyer contributions, which is statistically significant in the instrumental 
variables model, fall just short of statistical significance using a traditional probit model 
(p = 0.051).  There is mixed evidence of interest group capture taking place on state 
supreme courts with partisan elections.  Contributions from business decrease the 
likelihood of a liberal vote, even after taking into account differences in judicial ideology 
and correcting for endogeneity by using instrumental variables.  This finding suggests 
that justices in these states pay attention when tort cases are brought before them by 
segments of the business community that contribute heavily to their campaigns. 
Somewhat strangely, both types of probit models of partisan elections states 
indicate that an increase in contributions from lawyers decreases the likelihood of a 
33 The Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 is derived from the Stata procedure ivprobit, with the twostep 
option (Newey 1987) enabled.  The estimates presented in each table, however, are derived using MLE.  
This is appropriate because both approaches utilize the same exclusion restrictions (Schaffer 2010).  
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liberal vote, the opposite direction than hypothesized.  Two considerations put this 
finding into context.  First, the National Institute for Money in State Politics does not 
differentiate in its coding scheme between different types of lawyers.  Thus, these figures 
include contributions from trial lawyers and other legal specialists, including, potentially, 
corporate attorneys.  However, the American Judicature Society notes in several states 
that the bulk of contributions in judicial elections came from individuals associated with 
state trial lawyer associations (American Judicature Society 2013c).   
Second,  as Joanna Shepherd (2013, 3) notes: “In contrast [to the business 
community], the plaintiffs’ bar in many states is typically much more diverse in their 
economic interests because they represent such a diverse range of clients.”  The diversity 
of interests served by the bar formed the basis for much of the previous scholarship 
examining the influence of campaign contributions on state supreme court 
decisionmaking because many cases featured attorneys on both sides who were campaign 
contributors (Bonneau, Cann, and Boyea 2012; Bonneau and Cann 2009; Cann 2002). 
  Table 5.3 presents traditional and instrumental variables probit models for 
nonpartisan elections states.  Once again, the Wald test suggests an endogeneity problem 
(p < 0.01) for which the instrumental variables provided a solution, according to 
overidentification test (p = 0.621).  The other control variable, government involvement 
in a case, yielded a coefficient in the predicted direction (positive) but its effect falls just 
short of statistical significance in both probit models.  In both probit models, the 
coefficients for business contributions and lawyer contribution variables are in the 




The evidence of interest group capture is much stronger in states with nonpartisan 
elections.  When included alongside campaign contribution data, judicial ideology in 
nonpartisan elections states does not have a statistically significant effect on 
decisionmaking in either the traditional or instrumental variables probit approach.  
Running a simple bivariate probit model would, however, produce a significant 
relationship for judicial ideology.  This means that in cases in which there is a conflict 
between a justice’s ideological predilections and the interests of a campaign contributor, 
the latter prevails in formulating the justice’s decision. 
Nonpartisan election justices tend to raise considerably less money than their 
partisan elections brethren, but campaign contributions – especially from the business 
community – tend to be more influential.  According to Table 5.4, a business contribution 
of $10,000 to a nonpartisan elections justice, ceteris paribus, reduces the probability of a 
liberal vote by over five percent, while an identical contribution from lawyers only 
increases the chance of a liberal vote by less than one percent.  Again, the lack of more 
precise classification on what type of attorneys are making contributions might account 
for part of this disparity. 
This model attempts to tackle some of the methodological issues, both in terms of 
measurement and statistical technique, which other studies (e.g., Kang and Shepherd 
2011; McCall 2003; Shepherd 2013) have left unanswered, and it includes a much 
broader and deeper dataset than others (e.g., Bonneau and Cann 2009, 2009; Cann 2007). 
More importantly, it considers the problem of donor-recipient relationships in the context 





Implications for State Constitutional Design 
 
 Pennsylvania has utilized partisan elections to select its judges since before the 
Civil War, but in 1968, it adopted retention elections for reappointing its Supreme Court 
justices (American Judicature Society 2013a). Following the conviction of Justice Orie 
Melvin on corruption charges (Ward 2013), the legislature is considering moving to merit 
selection, which would make Pennsylvania a more traditional Missouri plan state 
(Bonneau 2013a).  Such a change would likely reduce the financial stakes involved in 
Pennsylvania judicial elections and promote greater levels of judicial independence.  In 
addition, creating a merit selection process may reduce the probability of selecting overly 
ambitious judges like Melvin in the future. 
 In 1998, North Carolina began electing its justices through nonpartisan elections, 
replacing the system of partisan elections that had existed since the Civil War (American 
Judicature Society 2013a).  The North Carolina General Assembly is now considering a 
proposal to return to the partisan elections system it only recently abandoned (Severino 
2013).  The data analyzed in this chapter suggest this proposed change may actually 
reduce the influence of campaign contributions, but it might increase the degree to which 
ideology drives judicial decisionmaking.  Considering the evidence of partisan and 
ideological behavior currently taking place in North Carolina, returning to partisan 
elections may not make much of a difference on this front.   
The first African-American female to serve on the North Carolina Supreme Court, 




Governor Bev Perdue, a Democrat, was set to be replaced by an incoming Republican.  
Purdue then bypassed the judicial commission, which traditionally makes 
recommendations for mid-term nominations, to select a candidate (“Perdue To Bypass 
Panel Method To Choose NC Justice” 2012).  Justice Paul Newby, who recently defeated 
an incumbent with $2.3 million in support from conservative interest groups, refused to 
recuse himself from participating in a review of the redistricting plan passed by the 
Republican-dominated state legislature (White 2012).   
 Returning to the recusal posed in West Virginia Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
(2009), the results from this analysis suggest that across the landscape of competitive 
judicial elections both threats to judicial independence exist.  First, justices in partisan 
election states tend to be reliable agents, representing the preferences of the parties who 
nominated them.  If a justice who is nominated by the Democratic Party sincerely sees 
the law through blue-tinted glasses (that is with a liberal judicial worldview) and votes 
accordingly, it does not pose a problem to the rule of law because his decisions do not 
change based on the contrary views of outside actors. 
 On the other hand, there is evidence of a quid pro quo in nonpartisan election 
states.  This finding is troubling to the rule of law because it undermines the neutrality 
needed for an adversarial judicial system to function effectively (Shapiro 1986).  If there 
were problems with justice being up for sale in the mid-to-late 1990’s, the prospects for 
the modern state supreme court landscape are incredibly troubling, given the rise in 
campaign spending and donations from interest groups since that time (Bonneau 2009; 




to consider these findings when debating changes to judicial reappointment methods, 




Chapter Six: Optimizing Judicial Independence Through Institutional Design 
 
Every constitution then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be 
enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right. 
       Thomas Jefferson (1950)  
 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s belief in each generation’s ability to determine its own 
constitutional destiny never quite caught on at the national level, though, as this chapter 
will later demonstrate, state policymakers seem much more comfortable with 
constitutional experimentation.34  Prior studies, both qualitative (Shugerman 2012) and 
quantitative (Hanssen 2004) have suggested that these institutional designs were created 
in attempts to preserve judicial independence from changing political circumstances over 
the course of American history.  This dissertation began by asking whether these 
differences in institutional design, particularly those affecting state supreme courts, 
affected levels of judicial independence exhibited by the justices operating within them.   
Judicial independence is a difficult concept for political scientists to measure.  In 
the three preceding empirical chapters, I have presented three different conceptual 
approaches of how an independent judge would behave with regard to different external 
pressures they may encounter: the agendas of political parties, the governing coalition, 
and campaign contributors.  The different judicial reappointment methods – partisan 
elections, nonpartisan elections, retention elections, and elite reconfirmation – produce 
varying levels of job security, while justices with life tenure need worry only about 
impeachment.  The proposed linkage between institutional design and judicial 
decisionmaking is reappointment uncertainty; that is, when judicial institutions are 
34 Prophetically enough, Jefferson’s calculations of a constitution lasting 19 years turns out to be the exact 
median age of a national constitution in the history of the world (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). 
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designed to give justices more certainty over their job security, one should expect them to 
exhibit greater levels of independence.   
Chapter 3 applied reappointment uncertainty to the decision to dissent on state 
supreme courts.  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, where ideology heavily structures this 
process, dissensus on state supreme courts is much lower, overall, and less a function of 
ideological differences.  Judicial ideology plays a role in the decision to dissent in states 
with high levels of reappointment uncertainty.  States with low levels of reappointment 
uncertainty not only produce fewer dissents along partisan grounds, but many fewer 
dissents overall.  The evidence presented also suggests that state supreme court behavior 
is influenced by reappointment methods, not selection methods.  
Chapter 4 considered one implication of reappointment uncertainty: the 
relationship between judicial decisionmaking and the preferences of the governing 
coalition.  I hypothesized that justices will follow the ideological direction of the majority 
coalition governing in their state if reappointment uncertainty is high.  The results 
supported this hypothesis.  Chapter 4 also considered the possibility that too much 
judicial independence might be counterproductive to a healthy democratic order.  In some 
instances, states with life tenure became significantly more liberal (conservative) as their 
state became more conservative (liberal). 
Finally, Chapter 5 examined the role reappointment uncertainty plays in campaign 
finance in state supreme court elections.  In this context, reappointment uncertainty plays 
a complex role in partisan elections because of the multiple principals a justice in these 




examined the possibility that the goals of a justice’s party might conflict with the goals 
sought by his campaign contributors.  When in conflict, partisanship tends to play a much 
bigger role in judicial decisionmaking of these justices.  In nonpartisan elections states, 
justices seem more willing to accommodate the interests of their campaign contributors at 
the expense of their own sincere view of the law, when they come into conflict.   
In more recent years, a higher percentage of incumbents in judicial elections have 
faced challengers, and the quality of challengers is increasing.  As the amount of money 
spent in judicial elections increases, voter roll-off decreases (Bonneau and Hall 2009).  
Voters in judicial elections may possess sophistication levels comparable to other down-
ballot campaigns (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985), although voters in several recent 
state polls have self-reported a lack of information about judicial candidates (American 
Judicature Society 2013b).  If this trend continues, it is entirely possible that the levels of 
job security measured across reappointment methods could change.  Justices in 
nonpartisan election states might lose some of the benefit they enjoy by having their 
incumbency status listed on the ballot.  More information about incumbents running in a 
retention election might lower levels of job security as well.  My theory of reappointment 
uncertainty is contingent upon levels of political sophistication, though voter knowledge 
should, in turn, be a result of constitutional design. 
However, regardless of what levels of job security result from different 
reappointment, one important consequence of institutional design remains: the mere 
possibility of judicial accountability is not sufficient to induce compliance with the 




literature on congressional oversight of the bureaucracy (Weingast and Moran 1983), the 
threat of not being reelected or reappointed must be viewed as credible in order to be 
effective.  State supreme court justices feel constrained only when their reappointing 
agents are attentive, united, and opposed – the same conditions Sean Theriault (2003) 
identified to predict instances in which Congress limits its own authority. 
 
Need for Further Research 
 
 Though many more political scientists are now studying state supreme courts than 
in the past, many fundamental aspects of this portion of this literature remain 
underdeveloped.  The development of new ideal points for state legislators (Berry et al. 
2010; Shor and McCarty 2011) has not yet been incorporated into ideology estimates of 
state supreme court justices.  The State Supreme Court Data Project, while invaluable in 
terms of its comprehensiveness, is becoming increasingly outdated.  Scholars are 
collecting new data on state supreme court decisions, some which has been shared 
publicly (Shepherd 2013), while other data, unfortunately, is not (Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner 2010).   
 Comparison studies between the data in the mid-1990s and in more time would 
shed light on the effect, if any, of the increasing political salience of judicial elections.  
Proponents of judicial independence have argued (Caufield 2009) that the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Republican Party v. White (2002) changed the rhetoric of judicial elections by 
affirming the free speech rights of judicial candidates.  It remains an open question 
whether this decision has changed judicial decisionmaking as well.  Recent data is also 




another area of state politics that is understudied (cf. Hazelton, Montgomery, and Nyhan 
2013).  The claim made by Brian Fitzpatrick (2009) that judicial nominating 
commissions select judges who are ideologically out of step with their state (more liberal) 
needs much more rigorous investigation.  
 Further questions concerning judicial independence on state supreme courts also 
remain.  Comparing the influence of campaign contributions using a more recent dataset 
to those presented herein would be instructive.  Supplementing the quantitative analysis 
in this project with qualitative data would create a richer understanding of state supreme 
court decisionmaking.  Interviews with current and former state supreme court justices 
would help generate additional hypotheses and test the validity of the assumptions made 
in the state court literature.  One of the most interesting differences between federal-level 
and state-level American constitutionalism is the presence of positive rights in many state 
constitutions (Zackin 2013).  In many instances, elected state supreme courts (e.g., 
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby 1989, Rose v. Council for Better 
Education 1989) have struck down education finance schemes as violative of state 
guarantees of a free and equal public education and ordered the legislature to formulate 
alternative plans.  Case studies of these instances, as well as quantitative analysis, could 
shed new light on the debate over the effectiveness of litigation to achieve social change 
(Rosenberg 1993) and judicial competency in policymaking (Horowitz 1977). 
Diagnosing the Empirical Implications of Constitutional Design 
 
What good does this information concerning state supreme court design serve?  




within the literature of comparative constitutional design (e.g., Gauri and Brinks 2010) by 
providing an American perspective on the empirical consequences of institutional 
choices.  It contributes to a fuller understanding of the evolution of American state 
politics (Shugerman 2012) to adapt to changing political and economic circumstances, 
such as the growth of political parties, the concentration of power among elites, and the 
power of economic interests to influence elections.  States have chosen different 
strategies to address these problems based on their own historical experience and that of 
neighboring states. 
Most of the U.S. Supreme Court literature on judicial independence (e.g., 
Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 2003; Clark 2010; Rosenberg 1992), demonstrates that the 
Court does not translate its institutional independence into decisional independence.  The 
story at the state-court level is much different, despite much larger incentives to be 
sensitive to the views of outside actors.  There are several possible reasons for this 
disparity.  First, presidents might be looking to select a different type of Supreme Court 
justice than state actors are looking for in choosing a state judge.  This rationale seems 
especially plausible in Missouri plan states, where the merit selection process attempts to 
limit the ideological dimensions of judicial selection (but see Fitzpatrick 2009).   
State supreme court justices are products of particular legal cultures that inculcate 
expectations of the judicial role (Carman 2012).  These expectations, likely, would 
include traditional norms of ignoring the views of outside actors, despite strategic reasons 
that would undermine these norms.  The position of state supreme court justice might 




justices would rather vote sincerely at the expense of their job security.  Members of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, jealously guard their position as the pinnacle of 
the American legal system.  Perhaps state supreme court justices feel as though they can 
exert their independence without outside actors perceiving their recalcitrance, given that 
they get much less media attention (Schaffner and Diascro 2009).   
Even more importantly, this project provides an excellent opportunity to engage 
in diagnostic political science (Lepawsky 1967).  Aristotle, the first (and arguably 
greatest) political scientist in history, defined our discipline as the study of the state.  In 
so doing, he provides much more than a unit of analysis; he urges political scientists to 
study the state in a way similar to that which a physician studies the body.  Medical 
doctors examine deficiencies in the body using the most rigorous – and unbiased – 
empirics available to them.  They do this, not out of a rational calculation that their time 
in medicine would earn them greater utility than spent in other pursuits, but out of a 
concern for the health of that body.  Shared medical norms, codified in the Hippocratic 
Oath, unite physicians in their discipline.   
The task of political science must be to use empirical inquiry to diagnose 
dysfunctions within the body politic.  Diagnostic political science is not a form of 
ideological advocacy, just as the practice of medicine is not ideological.  Being aware of, 
and intimately concerned with, the normative implications of one’s findings does not 
inherently bias the empirical inquiry.  The correct diagnosis to a medical or political 
problem must be made with the best available empirical data in order for treatment 




When empirical political scientists stop after presenting their findings and ignore 
the broader normative framework in which those results are situated, they miss an 
opportunity to engage with a wider audience for their scholarship.  This is an especially 
acute problem in light of recent failures to persuade Congress to continue supporting 
National Science Foundation funding for political science research (Sides 2013).  It also 
artificially substantively important research questions from being answered because out 
of fear in engaging in the normative implications.  By avoiding these questions, the 
discipline misses opportunities to build better theories as well. 
In order to start that diagnoses, we must first understand the virtues and vices 
connected to the two largest principles at work in the design of judicial reappointment 
institutions – judicial independence and popular constitutionalism. 




 Courts, and in particular appellate courts, are unique institutions within a 
democratic order.  While the decisions they render have implications for the broader 
political community, their primary duty is to resolve disputes between two parties.  In the 
adversarial system, judges hear both the arguments raised by the parties and issue a ruling 
(Shapiro 1986).  Political parties, political elites, the public at-large, campaign 
contributors are external to this dispute resolution process.  Institutional judicial 




interpreting the law as they see it to decide individual cases.  Judicial independence is, 
quite simply, necessary to the rule of law. 
 Because these external actors yield a great deal of political power, their influence 
could easily be exerted to promote the interests of the majority at the expense of 
individual litigants seeking protection of minority rights.  Judicial protection of rights, 
while an imperfect mechanism in reality (Rosenberg 1993), are an essential feature of 
American constitutional design.  Legislatures and executive institutions are designed, 
primarily, to pursue majoritarian goals.  Judiciaries need to be structured differently in 
order for the separation of powers to achieve its full normative potential.  From this 
perspective, judicial independence dates back to Magna Carta, one of the first efforts in 
the history to limit the power of the sovereign. Judicial independence dictates that those 
arrested for breaking the king’s law were not judged by agents of the monarch, but by a 
jury of their peers.  Executive manipulation of state judges, as discussed in Chapter 2, 




First coined by Bickel (1962), the countermajoritarian difficulty refers to the 
threat posed to the legitimacy of judicial review; specifically, when a small number of 
unelected judges serving life terms strikes down a law as unconstitutional, they override 
majority will as expressed through by representative institutions.   When courts exercise 
their institutional independence to combat the wishes of the majority, constitutional 




premised on the notion that it is the prerogative of the legislative branch to set law and 
policy (Blackstone 2001).  Courts should respect that prerogative because legislatures are 
designed to be representative, yet deliberative, institutions, drawing legitimacy from the 
consent of the governed.   
Appellate courts, on the other hand, are much less well designed to serve as 
representative institutions.  First they lack the specialized knowledge that modern 
legislators or bureaucrats possess to administer solutions to complex social problems 
(Horowitz 1977).  The creation of specialized courts that handle complex issues of 
administrative law, tax, bankruptcy provide evidence of this difficulty.  Second, appellate 
courts are simply too small to reflect the diverse constituencies (Perry 1991) that would 
be represented in a legislature, especially in a country where cross-cutting cleavages are 
considered an important feature of constitutional design (Madison 2010, 10). 
 Finally giving courts wide discretion to act independently creates a very 
hierarchical constitutional culture (Levinson 1989).  When popularly-elected institutions 
delegate authority to courts, they are discounting the possibility that non-judges should, 
or even could, play a role in constitutional interpretation.  Members of the U.S. Supreme 
Court are fond of arguing that “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are 
infallible only because we are final” (Brown v. Allen 1953), but the Court creates a sense 
of infallibility because of the strength of their position in the American constitutional 




The Promise and Perils of Popular Constitutionalism  
Virtues 
 
Judicial accountability serves a number of purposes.  The first is to provide a 
disincentive to judges acting illegally or unethically.  Many different processes can 
accomplish this function, from legislative impeachment to failure to secure renomination 
to electoral defeat or recall.  The broader virtue of judicial accountability that periodic 
reappointment of judges serves is engaging judges with a larger audience in a 
constitutional conversation (e.g., Ackerman 1993; Hogg and Bushell 1997; Kramer 2006; 
Levinson 1989; Powe 2009; Pozen 2010; Tushnet 2000).  One variation of this approach 
– the theory of popular constitutionalism – rejects the notion that courts should always 
have the final say in the determination of constitutional meaning.  Popular 
constitutionalism offers several benefits to the health of a democratic order, all of which 
increase democratic legitimacy by having citizens play a more important role in both 
ordinary and higher-order lawmaking.  Many of the virtues of popular constitutionalism 
reverse the vices of judicial independence and vice versa. 
The vast quantity of voting behavior literature (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet 1981) 
connecting the state of the economy to the two-party vote share in America demonstrates 
the degree to which politics has become a game of rent-seeking.  Political scientists have 
bought into conception of political life at a definitional level, by defining politics as “who 
gets what, when, how” (Lasswell 1936). Combined with an incredibly strong network of 
interest groups, who often play the same game (Rauch 1999), the scope of modern 




allocated by political institutions.  Popular constitutionalism hopes to redirect the answer 
to the pollster’s question: “Is the country headed in the right direction?” away from a 
quick appraisal of the unemployment rate and towards a more introspective evaluation of 
the practices and values that constitute American politics. 
Bruce Ackerman has documented that it is very difficult to raise the stakes of 
politics in this way, not only because the Article V system of constitutional change (at the 
federal level) is so cumbersome, but because citizens would need to consider 
constitutional change with “a seriousness that they do not normally accord to politics” 
(1993, 6).  This vision of constitutionalism, though it might seem overly-ambitious, is 
rooted in the Protestant tradition, which has defined the country’s dominant religious and 
political traditions (Elazar 1970; Levinson 1989).  Part of this difficult is rooted in the 
ignorance about both politics and civics, more broadly, which currently shapes the 
American political landscape.  The extent of citizen misinformation is well-documented 
in the literature (e.g., Delli Carpini 1996), but one particular favorite among the many 
disheartening findings is that more Americans can correctly identify the Three Stooges 
than the three branches of government (Hearst Corporation 1987).  The long-term 
problems with such levels of ignorance is that dramatic action only takes place after the 
country has gone past a tipping-point.  A commitment to popular constitutionalism 
conditions a people to engage in a more critical evaluation of the health of a polity before 
a war or economic crisis force such questions onto the national agenda.   
Judicial elections may help in implementing this constitutional approach.  Chris 




informed choices in judicial elections by preferring more experienced candidates and by 
participating at rates similar to those of other down-ballot races.  Bonneau and Cann 
(2012) have also demonstrated that voters in nonpartisan elections can discover the 
candidate who is ideologically more proximate without the benefit of partisan label on 
the ballot.   
James Gibson (2012) continues this line of research by demonstrating the 
legitimating effects of judicial elections. While voters find the influence of campaign 
contributions in judicial elections distasteful, they do not object to all forms of judicial 
electioneering.  More importantly, whatever negative effects might take place due to high 
levels of spending or negative advertising in a judicial election, the benefits of judicial 
elections overwhelm them and increase diffuse support for judicial institutions.  Gibson 
frames his analysis in terms of the tension between democratic accountability and judicial 
independence, and this may be too narrow an understanding of his findings.  Gibson’s 
own past work on the positivity bias exhibited towards courts (Gibson and Caldeira 2009) 




 The most obvious potential problem is distinguishing popular constitutionalism 
from raw majoritarianism (Alexander and Solum 2005).  The people rule in a democracy, 
but one purpose of a constitution is to establish an institutional design that is more 
sophisticated and deliberative than government-by-Nielsen-ratings.  Madison’s concerns 




Papers (2010).  Governing institutions that are too responsive would accommodate 
temporary and unreasonable passions to a degree, which, in the mind of Madison, would 
threaten the stability of the state.  Judicial elections, according to this line of reason, 
could threaten the rule of law if they accommodate similar swings in the mood of the 
electorate.   
Madison’s vision of a large republic with cross-cutting cleavages provides more 
insight into state judicial elections.  State polities (Elazar 1970) tend to be more culturally 
homogenous, which means that the threat to minority rights is more prevalent at the state 
level.  Indeed, Scot Powe’s study (2002) of the Warren Court turned conventional 
wisdom on its head: though the Warren Court struck down many laws as 
unconstitutional, most of these laws were state statutes.  In turn, most of these state 
statutes were outliers that did not have much support within the national ruling coalition.  
Viewed in this light, it becomes much more difficult to call the Warren Court 
countermajoritarian.  Allowing homogenous states to put additional majoritarian 
pressures on their state judiciaries could easily undermine minority rights protections. 
Though one of the fundamental principles of American democracy is “free trade 
in ideas” (Abrams v. United States 1919, 630), the marketplace established by judicial 
elections is a potentially very harsh one.  The point of a market is for its contents to be in 
flux, but the goals of the rule of law are to provide predictability and uniformity in a legal 
system.  If judicial elections lead to changes in judicial behavior, it could create shocks in 
the legal system, which undermines this goal.  In this particular battle between the public 




from very different perspectives.  While the public may have an abstract appreciation for 
the principles by which the rule of law is executed – stare decisis, the canons of statutory 
construction, judicial minimalism, etc. – their conception of the law is based mainly in 
terms of the underlying social and political values being expressed in the law (Zeisberg 
2009).  While judges are certainly concerned with these values as well, they approach 
their task with much greater concern for rule of law than most ordinary citizens might 
appreciate. 
 
A Practical Solution: The Missouri Plan 
 
 I believe as though social scientists should explain any potential biases they had 
before embarking on a project, even if it is impossible to overcome them completely (cf. 
Gurwitt 2001).  Like most political scientists, I entered graduate school without much an 
understanding (and certainly not an appreciation) of the various institutional designs of 
state courts.  I assumed that life tenure for judges was a constitutional necessity for 
designing an effective, yet fair, democratic government.  Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
historical propensity to conform to the wishes of outside actors in spite of its institutional 
independence (e.g., Clark 2010; McCloskey 2004; Powe 2009), any stronger system of 
judicial accountability seemed destined to undermine the rule of law. 
 The data on reappointment uncertainty used in this project tell a different story, 
however.  The periodic reappointment of state supreme court justices, in and of itself, 
does not cause judges to be very sensitive to the preferences of outside actors.  The 




Retention election justices, for example, understand that, from time to time, a very small 
number of their rank will be defeated in their quest for reelection, and yet they exhibit 
levels of decisional independence very similar to state-level justices who enjoy life 
tenure.  Consistent with the greater emphasis on flexibility at the state-level of 
constitutional design (see the discussion of state constitutional conventions and 
amendments below), most states want more flexibility than the federal government in 
staffing their benches, even if they choose not to utilize that discretion all that often.35  
 Having completed this project, I have a much different perspective on judicial 
elections (and reappointments overall).  Judicial independence should be thought of in 
terms of optimization, not maximization.  To adopt the latter perspective would require 
the total isolation of judges from their community.36  Such a judicial design is neither 
realistic nor normatively desirable.  Viewed in that light, the task for state constitutional 
designers is to choose institutions that balance popular constitutionalism, as expressed 
through democratic accountability, alongside the rule of law, as expressed through 
judicial independence.  Different people can justify different equilibrium points along this 
continuum, but as for me, the optimal balance is produced by the Missouri system of 
merit selection and retention elections. 
 The Missouri plan exhibits several positive indicators of judicial independence.  
Chapter 3 revealed little to no evidence that Missouri plan courts exhibit partisan 
polarization or ideological polarization.  As the evidence in Chapter 4 indicates, justices 
35  As a reminder, there is only one state in the union (Rhode Island) that neither requires their state 
supreme court justices to be reappointed nor imposes a mandatory retirement age – the key ingredients in 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.   
36 The closest approximation to this model might be trial judges in Colombia, who are hidden from view 
during drug trials to limit the possibility of assassination (Nagle 2011). 
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in these states do not change the ideological direction of their decisionmaking as the 
ideology of the governing coalition in their state changes.  In addition, there are many 
fewer dissenting opinions written in Missouri plan states than in states with higher levels 
of reappointment uncertainty.   
 The results of this dissertation fit within a larger scientific literature diagnosing 
the workings of the Missouri plan.  Reddick (2010) finds evidence that Missouri plan 
judges are significant less likely to violate judicial ethics laws than partisan or 
nonpartisan elected judges.  Hanssen (1999) argues that Missouri plan states show higher 
evidence of predictability of law based on differences in litigation rates between those 
state and non-merit selection states.  Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2010) find Missouri plan 
states enjoy enjoys high levels of prestige, second only to appointed states, based on rates 
of inter-state citations. Survey data of judges echoes this finding (Cann 2006), and 
retention election judges believe that competent performance is the key to retention 
(Aspin and Hall 1993).  More states have changed their judicial selection/reappointment 
methods to the Missouri plan than any other system in the last half century, which 
suggests the system is popular with policymakers and voters who have to ratify the 
change (Dubois 1989).  There is much less money involved in retention elections, and 
less evidence of campaign contributions influencing votes (Shepherd 2013). 
 
An Ideal Solution: State Constitutional Amendments or Conventions 
 
Citizens are not so uninformed or self-interested to able to shape their own 




convention can accomplish the goals of popular constitutionalism without disrupting the 
rule of law through the threat of sanction for judges who refuse to toe the line.  Amending 
or abandoning a constitution represents a deeper-throated expression of the voice of “We 
the People” because the procedures by which this change is accomplished are more 
rigorous than getting 50 percent plus one of the public37 to throw a judge out of office.   
This procedural rigor will likely spur more deliberation before action is taken, and if 
action is taken, it can lay claim to greater democratic legitimacy. 
 It would be a mistake to conclude that, based on the federal experience, that 
amending state constitutions or calling new state constitutional conventions are so 
unrealistic (Levinson 2012) that judicial elections are the only practical solution to pursue 
popular constitutionalism.  While the federal government has had just two constitutions 
in its history, Table 6.1 indicates the average state has undergone just under three 
constitutions, despite the fact that 37 of the 50 states are younger than the country.  For 
example, in just over a century, Alabama has approved 855 amendments to its latest 
Constitution.38  Virginia’s latest constitution of six was adopted in 1971, and since then, 
it has been amended almost twice as many times as the national Constitution.  Virginia 
may be a bit of an outlier in this regard because the members of the Confederacy were 
forced to rewrite their constitutions as a condition of reentering the Union during 
Reconstruction.   
37 See Table 1.3 for exceptions. 
38 This extraordinary rate of change exists, mostly, because, as Dillon’s Rule (Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & 
Missouri River Railraod 1868)  state, the state must be explicit in which powers it delegates to localities.  
See Gillette (1991) for a history of Iowa Supreme Court Justice John F. Dillon and his famous rule. 
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Even accounting for regional differences, the pace of constitutional development 
at the state level is remarkably faster than at the federal level.  The only state constitution 
with fewer amendments than the U.S. Constitution’s 27 is Illinois, but that is likely 
because the national document has had a 183-year head start.  Unlike the vast majority of 
states, the U.S. Constitution does not sanction its own demise by including procedures for 
calling a new constitutional convention.39  Perhaps most remarkably, 14 state 
constitutions require self-examination, by requiring periodic referenda on whether to call 
a new convention. 
“‘Is This Heaven?’ ‘No, It’s Iowa’”40: Concluding Thoughts  
 
 Returning to the Iowa Supreme Court, it would be safe to call their ruling in the 
same-sex marriage countermajoritarian behavior.  Not only did the decision in Varnum v. 
Brien (2009) overturn a state statute defining marriage as between one man and one 
woman, Iowans opposed the ruling in public opinion polls (Clayworth and Beaumont 
2009).41  Few retention elections result in the spending of significant amounts of money – 
either by the candidate or interest groups.  With less information given to voters, it 
reduces the impact of salient decision, which is a key condition for incumbent defeat 
(Cann and Wilhelm 2011). In 2008, however, Iowa’ state supreme court races did attract 
a great deal of spending by interest groups. 
39 Interestingly, the Articles of Confederation did include procedures for whole-sale constitutional change, 
which the founders ignored when they convened in Philadelphia in 1787 (Johnson 2003). 
40 For a more in depth discussion on the relationships between heaven, baseball, and Iowa see Kinsella 
(1999). 
41 Interestingly, a significant segment of the Iowa electorate expressed no opinion on the ruling. 
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 The decision and electoral defeats afterwards in Iowa highlights how institutional 
designs can have important consequences for judicial decisionmaking, minority rights, 
inter-branch relations, and representation theory.  At the end of the day, all democracies 
rule by the consent of “We the People,” and thus any judiciary that completely ignores 
the constitutional views of its people cannot survive for long (Hamilton 2010).  However, 
this reality of democratic constitutionalism does not automatically justify judicial 
accountability through contested elections.  Bonneau and Hall’s (2009) defense of 
judicial elections combines rigorous methods, excellent data, and a well-grounded theory 
of political engagement.  These authors used strong evidence to advance crucial 
normative questions about democratic constitutionalism.  Americans may well be up to 
the task of electing judges, at least in comparison to the level of sophistication at which 
they elect other officials (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985).   
 What Bonneau and Hall left unaddressed in their book42 was a countervailing, and 
I believe, equally important normative question about judicial independence and the rule 
of law.  In the same spirit, the goal of this work is to diagnose another normative concern 
with empirical data.  Democratic constitutionalism may rest on the consent of the 
governed, but that does not automatically mean that any temporary factional passion 
(Madison 2010) must be accommodated because passions, by definition, are not 
constitutive.  Taken to the extreme, judicial independence can produce a 
countermajoritarian difficulty, but judicial accountability taken to the extreme could 
result in a subservient judiciary.  Bonneau and Hall focus on judicial elections as a 
42 I would be remiss not to note these author’s earlier works on judicial independence (Boyea et al. 2009; 
e.g., Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall 1995). 
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mechanism to achieve popular constitutionalism (Kramer 2006), but they do not 
acknowledge alternate avenues for the people (or their elected representatives) to 
maintain supremacy in determining constitutional meaning. 
 Interestingly, I suspect the people of Iowa view democratic constitutionalism in 
the same fashion as Madison.  Booting some judges out of office may not require a deep 
deal of deliberation, and this is deeply troublesome to some scholars (Croley 1995; Geyh 
2003; Pozen 2010).  After the ruling, Iowa’s governor flipped from Democratic to 
Republican control, with the state legislature remaining almost evenly divided.  Several 
constitutional amendments have been introduced to define marriage as between one man 
and one woman, but they have not passed.  Why is this so?  The polling data showed a 
nearly even division over whether to amend the Constitution to ban gay marriage 
(Clayworth and Beaumont 2009).  Judges come and go, but the waves created by 
throwing judges out of office can continue long into the future.  
Constitutional amendments are more fundamental.  The people of Iowa, it 
appears, would like to proceed more cautiously and thoughtfully before making a more 
permanent solution to their definition of Iowa values and their conception of democratic 
constitutionalism.  In 2012, they applied that same cautiousness to creating more 
uncertainty in their judicial system.  Justice David Wiggins, also part of the majority in 
Varnum, won his retention election, and unlike his counterparts in 2008, he mounted a 
campaign that was supported by a variety of interest groups (Mehaffey 2012).  As Baum 
(2003, 38) notes, “[A]n effective campaign in support of an incumbent can neutralize the 




perfect example of a constitutional dialogue taking place between people and their 





Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1.1. Reappointment Methods of State Supreme Courts, 1995-9843 
 
Table 1.2. Percentage of State Supreme Court Incumbents Defeated, Faced Close 
Election, or Denied Reappointment, 1980-97  
 
43 Reappointment methods are listed for these years because they coincide with the years available in the 
State Supreme Court Data Project (Brace and Hall 2001).  Subsequently, several states have changed their 
reappointment methods (see Bonneau and Hall 2009). 
44 Justices in New Jersey are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate, and if they are 
reappointed and reconfirmed after their first term, they earn life tenure.  In the timeframe 1995-1998, each 











Alabama Georgia Alaska Connecticut Hawaii 
Arizona Idaho California Delaware New Jersey44 
Arkansas Kentucky Colorado Maine Massachusetts 
Louisiana  Michigan Florida New York New Hampshire 
North Carolina Minnesota Illinois South Carolina Rhode Island 
Texas Mississippi Indiana Vermont  
West Virginia Montana Iowa Virginia  
 Nevada Kansas   
 North Dakota Maryland   
 Ohio Missouri   
 Oregon Nebraska   
 Washington New Mexico   
 Wisconsin Oklahoma   
  Pennsylvania   
  South Dakota   
  Tennessee   
  Utah   
  Wyoming   
Method Defeated Close Races N 
Retention 2.0 2.8 252 
Nonpartisan 8.7 17.9 184 
Partisan 17.8 34.9 152 
 Denied Reappointment N 
Confirmation  1.4 74 
Data taken from Hall (2001), Bratton, Spill, and Sill (2012), and Martin et al. (2010). 
Close races are defined as elections in which the incumbent receives 55 percent of the 
vote or less. 
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Table 2.1. State Supreme Court Appointment and Reappointment Methods, 2012 
  
State Appointment Method Reappointment Method (if 
different) 
Alabama Partisan election   
Alaska Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Arizona Gubernatorial appointment from commission   
Arkansas Nonpartisan election   
California Gubernatorial appointment with commission confirmation Retention election 
Colorado Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Connecticut Gubernatorial nomination from commission, legislative 
appointment 
  
Delaware Gubernatorial nomination from  commission, senate consent   
Florida Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Georgia Nonpartisan election   
Hawaii Gubernatorial appointment from commission, senate consent Commission vote 
Idaho Nonpartisan election   
Illinois Partisan election Retention election  
(60% vote needed) 
Indiana Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Iowa Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Kansas Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Kentucky Nonpartisan election   
Louisiana  Partisan election   
Maine Gubernatorial nomination, senate consent   
Maryland Gubernatorial appointment from commission, senate consent Retnention election 
Massachusetts Gubernatorial appointment with approval of governor's council   
Michigan Partisan primary, nonpartisan election   
Minnesota Nonpartisan election   
Mississippi Nonpartisan election   
Missouri Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Montana Nonpartisan election Retention election if unopposed 
Nebraska Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Nevada Nonpartisan election   
New 
Hampshire 
Gubernatorial nomination from commission, appointment by 
executive council 
  
New Jersey Gubernatorial appointment, senate consent Reconfirmed only once,  
then tenure achieved 
New Mexico Partisan election Retention election  
(57% vote needed) 
New York Gubernatorial appointment from commission, senate consent   
North Carolina Nonpartisan election   
















Alabama 9 6 70 Mandatory No Yes 




Yes Apply all 





Arkansas 7 8  Mandatory No Unclear 
California 7 12  Discretionary Yes Unclear 





Connecticut 7 8 70 Discretionary No Unclear 
Delaware 5 12  Mandatory No Unclear 





Georgia 7 6  Mandatory Yes Yes 
Table 2.1., cont. 
State Appointment Method Reappointment Method (if 
different) 
Ohio Nonpartisan election   
Oklahoma (Civil) Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Oklahoma 
(Criminal) 
Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Oregon Nonpartisan election   
Pennsylvania Partisan election Retention election 
Rhode Island Gubernatorial appointment from commission, legislative 
confirmation 
 
South Carolina Legislative election   
South Dakota Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Tennessee Gubernatorial appointment from commission Retention election 
Texas (Civil) Partisan election   
Texas (Criminal) Partisan election   
Utah Gubernatorial appointment from commission, senate consent Retention election 
Vermont Gubernatorial appointment from commission, senate consent Legislative approval 
Virginia Legislative election   
Washington Nonpartisan election   
West Virginia Partisan election   
Wisconsin Nonpartisan election   
Wyoming Gubernatorial appointment from commission  Retention election 
   




Table 2.2., cont. 
State Court 
Size 
Term Length Retirement 





Hawaii 5 10 70 Mandatory No Apply all 
Idaho 5 6  Mandatory No Yes 
Illinois 7 10  Discretionary No Yes 










Kansas 7 1 year first, 6 years subsequent 70 Discretionary No Unclear 
Kentucky 7 8  Discretionary No Yes 
Louisiana  7 10 70 Both Yes Yes 
Maine 7 7  Mandatory No Yes 





Massachusetts 7 Tenure 70 Both No Unclear 
Michigan 9 6 70 Discretionary Yes Apply all 
Minnesota 7 6 70 Both No Yes 
Mississippi 9 8  Mandatory No Yes 





Montana 7 8  Mandatory Yes Yes 





Nevada 7 6  Mandatory Yes Yes 
New Hampshire 5 Tenure 70 Discretionary No Unclear 
New Jersey 7 7 years for first, then tenure 70 Both Yes Yes 
New Mexico 5 8  Mandatory No Unclear 
New York 7 14 70 Mandatory No Yes 
North Carolina 7 8 72 Discretionary No Yes 
North Dakota 5 10  Mandatory Yes Yes 
Ohio 7 6 70 Discretionary No Yes 
Oklahoma 
(Civil) 












Oregon 7 6 75 Both Yes Yes 
Pennsylvania 7 10 70 Both No Apply all 
Rhode Island 5 Life Tenure  Mandatory No Yes 
South Carolina 5 10 72 Mandatory No Yes 





Tennessee 5 8  Discretionary No Yes 
Texas (Civil) 9 6 74 Discretionary No Unclear 




Table 2.2., cont. 
State Court 
Size 
Term Length Retirement 










Vermont 5 6 70 Mandatory No Unclear 
Virginia 7 12 70 Discretionary No Yes 
Washington 9 6 75 Discretionary Yes Unclear 
West Virginia 5 12  Discretionary No Yes 
Wisconsin 7 10 70 Discretionary Yes No 





Data from American Judicature Society (2013e) and National Center for State Courts (2009). 
Some state constitutions allow judges salaries to be lowered if it is part of a pay cut that applies to all state 
workers. 
 
Table 2.3. Judicial Election Features, 2012 
 




Public Finance Voter Guide 
Alabama Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
Alaska Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Arizona Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Arkansas Singlemember Statewide November Yes No   
California Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
(distributes) 
Colorado Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
Florida Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
Georgia Singlemember Statewide August Yes No Nonprofit 
Idaho Singlemember Statewide November Yes No   
Illinois Singlemember District November Yes No Nonprofit 
Indiana Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Iowa Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Kansas Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Kentucky Singlemember District November Yes No   
Louisiana  Singlemember District December Yes No   
Maryland Singlemember District November No No Nonprofit 
Michigan Multimember Statewide November No No Government 
Minnesota Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
Mississippi Singlemember District November Yes No   
Missouri Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Montana Singlemember Statewide November No No   
Nebraska Singlemember District November No No Nonprofit 




Table 2.3., cont. 




Public Finance Voter Guide 
New Mexico Singlemember Statewide November Yes Yes Nonprofit 
North Carolina Singlemember Statewide November No Yes Government 
(distributes) 
North Dakota Singlemember Statewide November Yes No   
Ohio Singlemember Statewide November Yes No Government 
Oklahoma Singlemember District November No No   
Oregon Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
Pennsylvania Multimember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
South Dakota Singlemember District November No No   
Tennessee Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
Texas Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 
Utah Singlemember Statewide November No No Government 
(distributes) 
Washington Singlemember Statewide November Yes No Government 
West Virginia Multimember Statewide November Yes No   
Wisconsin Singlemember Statewide April Yes Yes Nonprofit 
Wyoming Singlemember Statewide November No No Nonprofit 











Incumbent Defeat Number of incumbent state supreme court justices defeated who were 







1 for states with nonpartisan elections to reappoint judges, 0 otherwise 
Retention Elections 1 for states with retention elections to reappoint judges, 0 otherwise 
Elite Reconfirmation 1 for states with gubernatorial and or legislative reappointment of 
judges, 0 otherwise 
Life Tenure 1 for states with life tenure for judges, 0 otherwise 
Mandatory 
Retirement Age 
1 for states with mandatory retirement age, 0 otherwise 
Judicial Recall 1 for states with judicial recall procedures, 0 otherwise 




6.21 to 41.90 average folded Berry elite ideology score45 
Party Competition 
Variance 




45 The theoretical mean of the Berry (Berry et al. 1998) Elite Ideology score is 50 with a range of 0-100.  In 
order to transform this index from one measuring ideology into interparty-competition levels, I calculated 
|Berry score - 1| /2 over each state-year, which is a technique similar to Hanssen (2004).  I then took an 
average of the folded scores. 
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Table 2.5. Negative Binomial Regression of Factors Influencing State Supreme Court 
Incumbent Defeat, 1980-97 
 
Variable Coef. S.E. p 
Nonpartisan Elections -0.297 (0.374) 0.427 
Retention Elections -1.197 (0.393) 0.002 
Elite Reconfirmation -3.294 (1.050) 0.002 
Life Tenure -16.807 (1352.659) 0.990 
Mandatory Retirement Age -0.045 (0.301) 0.881 
Judicial Recall -0.697 (0.368) 0.058 
Salary Protection -0.106 (0.339) 0.755 
Party Competition Mean 0.020 (0.023) 0.385 
Party Competition Variation 0.064 (0.066) 0.332 
Constant -2.459 (0.925) 0.008 
N = 50, χ2 = 30.19, Pseudo-R2 = 0.204 
As terms of office vary state-to-state, the number of judge-elections is  
included as an exposure term. Data taken from Bratton, Spill, and  

























































Figure 2.2. Example of Institutional Independence Creating Decisional Independence in 





































Table 3.1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Dependent Variable Description 
Dissent 1 for joining or writing a dissenting opinion, 0 otherwise 
(SSCDP) 
    
Independent Variables   
Ideological Distance 0-84, the absolute value difference in PAJID scores between 
the justice in question and the majority opinion writer  
Legal Complexity 0-3.40, natural log of number of legal issues raised in a case 
(SSCDP) 
Amici Present 1 if any briefs amicus curiae were submitted, 0 otherwise 
(SSCDP) 
Constitutional Claim 1 if case involves a claim under the state constitution, 0 
otherwise (SSCDP) 
Mandatory Jurisdiction 0 if state has discretionary jurisdiction in civil cases, 1 if has 
mandatory jurisdiction, .5 if combination (Lindquist 2010) 
Law Clerks 1-6, number of law clerks assigned to state supreme court 
justices (Lindquist 2010) 
Court Size 5-9, number of justices on each state supreme court (SSCDP) 
En Banc 1 for cases head en banc, 0 otherwise (SSCDP) 
C.J. Writing Majority 1 for cases in which the chief justice has written the majority 
opinion (SSCDP) 
C.J. Makes Assignments 1 for states in which the chief justice assigns the majority 
opinion (SSCDP) 
Median Tenure 0-17, median tenure of justices on court-year in question 
(Lindquist 2010) 
Chief Justice 1 if the justice in question is the chief justice, 0 otherwise 
(SSCDP) 
Freshman 1 if justice in question is a freshman, 0 otherwise (Bratton et 
al. 2012) 
Outlier Justice Polarization 0.006-48.75, |Justice Ideology – 50| for liberal justices in 
conservative states and vice versa, SSCDP 
State Ideological 
Polarization 






Table 3.2. Multilevel Logit Model of Dissensus on State Supreme Courts in Tort Cases 
Using Partisan Differences and Ideological Distance, 1995-1998 
 
Fixed Effects  Coef. S.E. p 
Ideological Distance 0.001 0.002 0.536 
Legal Complexity 0.002 0.064 0.971 
Amici Present 0.285 0.082 0.001 
Constitutional Claim -0.285 0.234 0.223 
Mandatory Jurisdiction -0.384 0.071 0.000 
Law Clerks 0.212 0.031 0.000 
Court Size 0.128 0.026 0.000 
En Banc 0.583 0.089 0.000 
C.J. Writing Majority 0.079 0.109 0.465 
C.J. Makes Assignments -0.165 0.078 0.034 
C.J. Writing * Makes 0.128 0.177 0.468 
Chief Justice -0.176 0.087 0.043 
Freshman -0.107 0.082 0.189 
Median Tenure 0.052 0.009 0.000 
Constant -4.585 0.320 0.000 
    
Random Effects S.D. S.E.  
Ideological Distance 0.002 0.002  
Constant  0.521 0.182  
    
Wald χ2 269.22 p <  0.001 




















Table 3.3. Multilevel Logit Model of Dissensus on State Supreme Courts, Including 
Hybrid States  
 
Fixed Effects  Coef. S.E. p 
Ideological Distance 0.001 0.002 0.604 
Legal Complexity -0.001 0.064 0.994 
Amici Present 0.305 0.082 0.000 
Constitutional Claim -0.301 0.235 0.200 
Mandatory Jurisdiction -0.382 0.071 0.000 
Law Clerks 0.208 0.036 0.000 
Court Size 0.127 0.026 0.000 
En Banc 0.572 0.089 0.000 
C.J. Writing Majority 0.064 0.109 0.555 
C.J. Makes Assignments -0.173 0.079 0.028 
C.J. Writing * Makes 0.129 0.178 0.468 
Chief Justice -0.181 0.087 0.036 
Freshman -0.114 0.082 0.163 
Median Tenure 0.052 0.009 0.000 
Constant -4.521 0.295 0.000 
    
Random Effects S.D. S.E.  
Ideological Distance 0.002 0.002  
Constant  0.473 0.157  
    
Wald χ2 255.13 p <  0.001 
































Table 3.4. Dissensus Among Outlier Justices on Partisan and Nonpartisan Election State 
Supreme Courts 
 
Fixed Effects Coef. S.E. p 
Outlier Justice Polarization 0.019 0.030 0.522 
State Ideological Polarization  -0.020 0.021 0.335 
Outlier Justice Pol. * State Ideo. Pol. 0.001 0.001 0.459 
Constant -2.716 0.599 0.000 
    
Random Effects S.D. S.E.  
Judge 1.005 0.166  
    
Wald χ2 4.48   








Table 4.1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Dependent Variable Description 
Liberal Vote 1 for a liberal vote, 0 otherwise 
   
Independent Variables  
Justice Liberalism 0.01 to 1 PAJID score for justice liberalism (Brace, Langer, and 
Hall 2000) 
State Liberalism -36.48 to 42.55 score for annual change in elite ideology (increase 
in liberalism) in a state with a one-year lag (Berry et al. 1998) 
State Involved 1 if state or local government involved in case, 0 otherwise 
(SSCDP) 




Table 4.2. Multilevel Logit Models of State Supreme Court Responsiveness to Changes 
in the Political Environment in Select Tort Cases, 1995-1998 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed Effects  Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
State Liberalism 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Justice Liberalism 0.203 0.103 0.049 0.211 0.103 0.041 
State Involved -0.364 0.152 0.017 -0.359 0.152 0.018 
Constitutional Claim 0.002 0.003 0.478 0.002 0.003 0.508 
Constant -0.207 0.054 0.000 -0.190 0.053 0.000 
        
Random Effects S.D. S.E.  S.D. S.E.  
State Liberalism 0.006 0.003  0.006 0.003  
Constant 0.087 0.033  0.089 0.034  
        
Groups 5   6   
Wald χ2 22.77   21.90   





Figure 4.1. Influence of Changes in the Political Environment on Judicial 

































Figure 4.2 Influence of Changes in the Political Environment on Judicial Decisionmaking 



































Table 5.1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Dependent Variable Description 
Liberal Vote 1 for a liberal vote, 0 otherwise (SSCDP) 
   
Independent Variables   
Business Contributions 3.2189 to 13.741, natural log of total contributions from relevant industry in last 
election (NIMSP) 
Lawyer Contributions  6.9078 to 13.654, natural log of total contributions from lawyers in last election 
(NIMSP) 
Justice Liberalism 0.01 to 1, PAJID score for justice liberalism (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000) 
State Involved 1 if state or local government involved in case, 0 otherwise (SSCDP) 
Constitutional Claim 1 if case involves a claim under the state constitution, 0 otherwise (SSCDP) 
    
Instrumental Variables   
Torts Docket 5 to 97, number of tort cases in each state in 1996 (SSCDP) 
Campaign Finance Stringency 3 to 17, Witko (2005) index of state campaign finance law stringency 
Quality Candidate 1 if justice had run for office prior to most recent election, 0 otherwise (JEDI) 
Freshman 1 if justice is a freshman, 0 otherwise (SSCDP) 
 
 
Table 5.2. Probit and Instrumental Variables Probit Models of Selected Tort Cases in 
Partisan Election States, 1995-1998 
 
 Probit Instrumental Variables 
Variable Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Business Contributions -0.122 0.037 0.001 -0.149 0.075 0.048 
Lawyer Contributions -0.086 0.044 0.051 -0.192 0.061 0.002 
Justice Liberalism 0.018 0.007 0.012 0.025 0.012 0.034 
Government Involved 1.019 0.341 0.003 0.950 0.341 0.005 
Constitutional Claim 1.352 0.629 0.032 1.297 0.627 0.038 
Constant 1.532 0.582 0.008 2.873 0.817 0.000 
(Probit) Pseudo-R2 = 0.063, (IV) Wald Exogeneity Test χ2 = 15.10 (p < 0.001) 






Table 5.3. Probit and Instrumental Variables Probit Models of Selected Tort Cases in 
Nonpartisan Election States, 1995-1998 
 
 Probit Instrumental Variables 
Variable Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Business Contributions -0.150 0.031 0.000 -0.209 0.036 0.000 
Lawyer Contributions 0.224 0.054 0.000 0.352 0.074 0.000 
Justice Liberalism -0.006 0.004 0.140 -0.011 0.005 0.016 
Government Involved -1.067 0.565 0.059 -1.025 0.537 0.056 
Constitutional Claim (omitted)      
Constant -1.174 0.559 0.036 -1.992 0.712 0.005 
(Probit) Pseudo-R2 = 0.056, (IV) Wald Exogeneity Test χ2 = 9.51 (p < 0.01) 
(Both) n = 469, (IV) Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 = 0.954 (p = 0.621) 
 
 
Table 5.4. Change in Probability of a Liberal Vote (Marginal Effect) of $10,000 in 
Campaign Contributions, By Electoral System 
 
Contribution Type Electoral System M.E. 
Business Contributions Partisan Elections -0.021 
Lawyer Contributions Partisan Elections -0.003 
Business Contributions Nonpartisan Elections 0.014 






Table 6.1. American Constitutional Development at the State and Federal Level 
 












Alabama 6 Yes No 1901 855 7.70 
Alaska 1 Yes Yes 1959 29 0.55 
Arizona 1 Yes No 1912 147 1.47 
Arkansas 5 No No 1874 98 0.71 
California 2 Yes No 1879 525 3.95 
Colorado 1 Yes No 1876 155 1.14 
Connecticut 4 Yes Yes 1965 30 0.64 
Delaware 4 Yes No 1897 142 1.23 
Florida 6 Yes No 1969 118 2.74 
Georgia 10 Yes No 1983 71 2.45 
Hawaii 1 Yes Yes 1959 110 2.08 
Idaho 1 Yes No 1890 123 1.01 
Illinois 4 Yes Yes 1971 12 0.29 
Indiana 2 No No 1851 47 0.29 
Iowa 2 Yes Yes 1857 54 0.35 
Kansas 1 Yes No 1861 95 0.63 
Kentucky 4 Yes No 1891 41 0.34 
Louisiana  11 Yes No 1974 168 4.42 
Maine 1 Yes No 1820 172 0.90 
Maryland 4 Yes Yes 1867 225 1.55 
Massachusetts 1 No No 1780 120 0.52 
Michigan 4 Yes Yes 1964 30 0.63 
Minnesota 1 Yes No 1858 120 0.78 
Mississippi 4 No Yes 1890 125 1.02 
Missouri 4 Yes Yes 1945 114 1.70 
Montana 2 Yes No 1973 31 0.79 
Nebraska 2 Yes No 1875 228 1.66 
Nevada 1 Yes No 1864 136 0.92 
New Hampshire 2 Yes Yes 1784 145 0.64 
New Jersey 3 No No 1948 45 0.70 
New Mexico 1 Yes No 1912 160 1.60 
New York 4 Yes Yes 1895 220 1.88 
North Carolina 3 Yes No 1971 30 0.73 
North Dakota 1 No No 1889 150 1.22 
Ohio 2 Yes Yes 1851 172 1.07 




Table 6.1., cont.       












Oregon 1 Yes No 1859 249 1.63 
Pennsylvania 5 No No 1968 30 0.68 
Rhode Island 3 Yes Yes 1986 10 0.38 
South Carolina 7 Yes No 1896 497 4.28 
South Dakota 1 Yes No 1889 215 1.75 
Tennessee 3 Yes No 1870 39 0.27 
Texas 5 No No 1876 474 3.49 
Utah 1 Yes No 1896 115 0.99 
Vermont 3 No No 1793 54 0.25 
Virginia 6 Yes No 1971 46 1.12 
Washington 1 Yes No 1889 105 0.85 
West Virginia 2 Yes No 1872 71 0.51 
Wisconsin 1 Yes No 1848 145 0.88 
Wyoming 1 Yes No 1980 98 3.06 
United States 2 No No 1788 27 0.12 
Average (all states) 2.94 41/50 = Yes 14/50 = Yes  147.56 1.44 
Average (non-South) 2.08 33/39 = Yes 13/39 = Yes  124.54 1.11 


















































Agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor 
Attorney (includes bar applicant or law student) 
Buyer/purchaser/consumer 
Child or children 
Disability benefit claimant 
Disabled person 
Employee or job applicant - not able to identify race or 
gender 
Employer/supervisor 
Heir or beneficiary 
Husband or ex-husband 
Landlord or owner 
Licensee or permit holder 
Parent or parents 
Parolee 
Patient 
Person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime 
Person convicted of crime 
Person involuntarily committed 




Protestor, demonstrator, picketer 
Public official – elected 
Public official - non elected 
Public official - don’t know if elected or not elected 
Seller/creditor 
Stockholder 
Student or student applicant 
Taxpayer 
Teacher 
Tenant or lessee 
Unemployed person or claimant 
Voter 
Welfare recipient or welfare applicant 






Table B.1. Coding Scheme for National Institute on Money in State Politics Data 
 
Lawyers Premises Liability 
Business Sector 
Attorneys & law firms Energy & Natural Resources 
  
Medical Malpractice Industry 
Industry  Business Associations 
Business Associations Construction 
Conservative Policy Organization Crop Production & Basic Processing 
Health Professionals Crop Production & Basic Processing & Livestock 
Hospitals & Nursing Homes Dairy 
Insurance Farm Bureaus 
Pharmaceuticals & Health Products Food Processing & Sales 
 Forestry & Forest Products 
Automobile Freight & delivery services 
Industry Livestock 
Automotive Lodging & Tourism 
Business Associations Movie Theatres 
Conservative Policy Organization Poultry & Eggs 
Business Recreation & Live Entertainment 
Motor homes & camper trailers Retail Sales 
Motorcycles, snowmobiles & other motorized vehicles Telephone Utilities 
 Tobacco 
Toxic Products  
Industry Business 
Aluminum Mining & Processing Veterinarians 
Business Associations  
Conservative Policy Organizations Insurance 
Electronics Manufacturing & Services Industry 
Nuclear Energy Insurance 
Oil & Gas  
Smelting & Refining  
Waste Management  
Business  
Agricultural chemicals (fertilizers & pesticides)  
Chemical & Related Manufacturing  





Table B.1., cont. 
Products Liability  
Industry  
Agriculture  
Beer, Wine & Liquor  
Business Associations  
Chemical & Related Manufacturing  
Conservative Policy Organization  
Electronics Manufacturing & Services  
Food & Beverage  
Miscellaneous Manufacturing & Distributing  
Pharmaceuticals & Health Products  
Tobacco companies & tobacco product sales  
Business  
Aircraft manufacturers  
Auto manufacturers  
Computer manufacture & services  
Manufacturers of railroad equipment  
Steel manufacturing  
Truck & trailer manufacturers  
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